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Abstract
We propose the realized systemic risk beta as a measure for ﬁnancial companies’
contribution to systemic risk given network interdependence between ﬁrms’ tail risk
exposures. Conditional on statistically pre-identiﬁed network spillover effects and
market as well as balance sheet information, we deﬁne the realized systemic risk
beta as the total time-varying marginal effect of a ﬁrm’s Value-at-risk (VaR) on the
system’s VaR. Statistical inference reveals a multitude of relevant risk spillover chan-
nels and determines companies’ systemic importance in the U.S. ﬁnancial system.
Our approach can be used to monitor companies’ systemic importance allowing for
a transparent macroprudential supervision.
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11. Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2009 has shown that cross-sectional dependencies between as-
sets and credit exposures can cause risks of individual banks to cascade and build up to a
substantial threat for the stability of an entire ﬁnancial system.1 Under certain economic
conditions, company-speciﬁc risk cannot be appropriately assessed in isolation without
accounting for potential risk spillover effects from other ﬁrms. In fact, it is not just its
size and idiosyncratic risk but also its interconnectedness with other ﬁrms which deter-
mines a company’s systemic relevance, i.e., its potential to signiﬁcantly increase the risk
of failure of the entire system – which we denote as systemic risk.2 While there is a broad
consensus that any prudential regulatory policy should account for the consequences of
network interdependencies in the ﬁnancial system, in practice, however, any attempt of
a transparent implementation must fail, as long as suitable empirical measures for ﬁrms’
individual risk, risk spillovers and systemic relevance are not available. In particular, it
is unclear how to quantify individual risk exposures and systemic risk contributions in an
appropriate but still parsimonious and empirically tractable way for a prevailing under-
lying network structure. Moreover, there is an apparent need for respective empirically
feasible measures which only rely on available data of publicly disclosed balance sheet
and market information but still account for the complexity of the ﬁnancial system.
A general empirical assessment of systemic relevance cannot build on the vast theo-
retical literature of ﬁnancial network models and ﬁnancial contagion, since these results
typically require detailed information on intra-bank asset and liability exposures (see,
e.g., Allen and Gale, 2000, Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet, 2000, and Leitner, 2005). Such
data is generally not publicly disclosed and even supervision authorities can only collect
partial information on some sources of inter-bank linkages. Available empirical studies
linked to this literature can therefore only partially contribute to a full picture of compa-
1For a thorough description of the ﬁnancial crisis, see, e.g., Brunnermeier (2009).
2Bernanke (2009) and Rajan (2009) stress the danger induced by institutions which are “too intercon-
nected to fail” or ”too systemic to fail” in contrast to the insufﬁcient focus on ﬁrms which are simply “too
big too fail”.
2nies’ systemic relevance as they focus on particular parts of speciﬁc markets at a partic-
ular time under particular ﬁnancial conditions (see, e.g., Upper and Worms, 2004, and
Furﬁne, 2003, for Germany and the U.S., respectively).3 Furthermore, assessing risk in-
terconnections on the basis of multivariate failure probability distributions has proven to
be statistically complicated without using restrictive assumptions driving the results (see,
e.g., Boss, Elsinger, Summer, and Thurner, 2004, or Zhou, 2009, and references therein).
Finally, for banking supervisors it is often unclear, how complex structures ultimately
translate into dynamic and predictable measures of systemic relevance.
The objective of this paper is to develop an easily and widely applicable measure of
a ﬁrm’s systemic relevance, explicitly accounting for the company’s interconnectedness
within the ﬁnancial sector. We assess companies’ risk of ﬁnancial distress on the ba-
sis of share price information which directly incorporates market perceptions of a ﬁrm’s
prospects, publicly accessible market data as well as balance sheet data. Our measure
quantiﬁes the risk of distress of individual companies and the entire system according to
the tails of the corresponding asset return distributions, and is thus based on respective
extreme conditional quantiles. In this sense, it builds on the concept of conditional Value-
at-Risk (VaR), which is a popular and widely accepted measure for tail risk.4 For each
ﬁrm, we identify its so-called relevant (tail) risk drivers as the minimal set of macroe-
conomic fundamentals, ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics and risk spillovers from competitors
and other companies driving the company’s VaR. Detecting with whom and how strongly
any institution is connected allows us to construct a tail risk network of the ﬁnancial sys-
tem. A company’s contribution to systemic risk is then deﬁned as the induced total effect
of an increase in its individual tail risk on the VaR of the entire system, conditional on the
3See also Cocco, Gomes, and Martins (2009) for parts of the ﬁnancial sector in Portugal, Elsinger,
Lehar, and Summer (2006) for Austria, and Degryse and Nguyen (2007) for Belgium. A rare exception is
the unique data set for India with full information on the intra-banking market studied in Iyer and Peydrió
(2011).
4Note that the VaR is a coherent risk measure in realistic market settings, i.e., in cases of return distri-
butions with tails decaying faster than those of the Cauchy distribution, see Garcia, Renault, and Tsafack
(2007). In principle, our methodology could also be adapted to other tail risk measures such as, e.g., ex-
pected shortfall. Such a setting, however, would involve additional estimation steps and complications,
probably inducing an overall loss of accuracy in results given the limited amount of available data.
3ﬁrm’s position within the ﬁnancial network as well as overall market conditions. 5 Fur-
thermore, by assessing a company’s conditional VaR in dependence of respective tail risk
drivers, we obtain a reliable measure of a company’s idiosyncratic risk in the presence of
network spillovers.
The underlying statistical setting is a two-stage quantile regression approach: In the
ﬁrst step, ﬁrm-speciﬁc VaRs are estimated as functions of ﬁrm characteristics, macroe-
conomic state variables as well as tail risk spillovers of other banks which are captured
by loss exceedances. Hereby, the major challenge is to shrink the high-dimensional set
of possible cross-linkages between all ﬁnancial ﬁrms to a feasible number of relevant
risk connections. We address this issue statistically as a model selection problem in in-
dividual institution’s VaR speciﬁcations which we solve in a pre-step. In particular, we
make use of novel Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) techniques
(see Belloni and Chernozhukov, 2011) which allows us identifying the relevant tail risk
drivers for each company in a fully automatic way. The resulting identiﬁed risk intercon-
nections are best represented in terms of a network graph as illustrated in Figure 1 (and
discussed in more detail in the remainder of the paper) for the system of the 57 largest
U.S. ﬁnancial companies. In the second step, for measuring a ﬁrm’s systemic impact, we
individually estimate the VaR of a value-weighted index of the ﬁnancial sector as func-
tion of the ﬁrm’s estimated VaR while controlling for the pre-identiﬁed company-speciﬁc
risk drivers as well as macroeconomic state variables. We derive standard errors which
explicitly account for estimation errors resulting from the pre-estimation of regressors in
quantile relations. As the generally available sample sizes of balance sheet and macroe-
conomic information make the use of large-sample inference questionable, we provide
(non-standard) bootstrap methods to construct ﬁnite-sample-based parameter tests.
We determine a company as systemically relevant if the marginal effect of its individ-
ual VaR on the VaR of the system is detected as statistically signiﬁcant. In analogy to an
5Note that we focus our analysis on dependencies of extreme tail risks to evaluate the systemic impact
of the riskiness of a speciﬁc ﬁrm. Though the presented econometric methodology is readily extendable
to also detect system tail risk consequences from non-extreme individual shocks by including individual
VaR’s around e.g. the 25% or even closer to the 50% level.
4Figure 1: Risk network of the U.S. ﬁnancial system schematically highlighting key companies
in the system in 2000-2008. Details on all other ﬁrms in the system only appearing as unlabeled
shaded nodes will be provided later in the paper. Depositories are marked in red, broker dealers
in green, insurance companies in black, and others in blue. An arrow pointing from ﬁrm j to
ﬁrm i reﬂects an impact of extreme returns of j on the VaR of i (V aRi) which is identiﬁed as
being relevant employing statistical selection techniques presented in the remainder of the paper.
VaRs are measured in terms of 5%-quantiles of the return distribution. The effect of j on i is
measured in terms of the impact of an increase of the return Xj on V aRi given Xi is below its
10% quantile, i.e., i’s so-called loss exceedance. The size of the respective increase in V aRj given
a 1% increase of the loss exceedance of i is reﬂected by the thickness of the respective arrowhead
where we distinguish between three categories: thin arrowheads display an increase up to 0.4,
medium size of 0.4-0.8, and thick arrowheads of greater than 0.8. The thickness of the line of
the arrow is chosen along the same categories. If arrows point in both directions, the thickness of
the line corresponds to the bigger one of the two effects. The graph is constructed such that the
total length of all arrows in the system is minimized. Accordingly, more interconnected ﬁrms are
located in the center.
(inverted) asset pricing relationship in quantiles we call the measure systemic risk beta. It
corresponds to the system’s marginal risk exposure due to changes in the tail of a ﬁrm’s
loss distribution. For comparing the degree of systemic importance of companies across
the system, however, it is necessary to compute the induced total increase in systemic
risk. We therefore rank companies according to their ”realized” systemic risk beta corre-
sponding to the product of a company’s systemic risk beta and its VaR. The systemic risk
beta - and therefore also its realized version - is modeled as a function of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
characteristics, such as leverage, maturity mismatch and size. Accordingly, a ﬁrm’s tail
5risk effect on the system can vary with its economic conditions and/or its balance sheet
structure changing its marginal systemic importance even though its individual risk level
might be identical at different time points.
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Figure 2: Systemic importance of ﬁve exemplary ﬁrms in the U.S. ﬁnancial system at two time
points before and at the height of the ﬁnancial crisis, 2008. Systemic relevance is determined by
the statistical signiﬁcance and positivity of ”systemic risk betas” quantifying the marginal increase
of the VaR of the system given an increase in a bank’s VaR while controlling for the bank’s (pre-
identiﬁed) risk drivers. All VaRs are computed at the 5% level and are by deﬁnition positive. We
depict the degreeof systemic relevance bythe size of respective“realized” versions of the systemic
risk beta corresponding to the product of a risk beta and the corresponding VaR representing
a company’s total effect on systemic risk. Connecting lines are added to graphically highlight
changes between the two time points but do not mark real evolutions. The size of the elements in
the graph reﬂects the size of the VaR of the respective company at each of the two time points.
We use the following scale: the element is k times the standard size with k = 1 for V aR  0:05,
k = 1:5 for V aR 2 (0:05;0:1], k = 2 for V aR 2 (0:1;0:15], k = 3 for V aR 2 (0:2;0:25]
and k = 5:5 for V aR 2 (0:65;0:7]. Attached numbers inside the ﬁgure mark the position of the
respective company in an overall ranking of the 57 largest U.S. ﬁnancial companies for each of
the two time points.
OurempiricalresultsrevealahighdegreeoftailriskinterconnectednessamongU.S.ﬁ-
nancial institutions. In particular, we ﬁnd that these network risk interconnection effects
are the dominant risk drivers in individual risk. The detected channels of potential risk
spillovers can to a large part be attributed to direct credit or liquidity exposures, but in
some cases especially for mutual effects, they might also result from common, e.g., sector
or business model speciﬁc factors, not covered by the fundamental ﬁrm speciﬁc controls
in the model. In any case, these links contain fundamental information for supervision
authorities but also for company risk managers. Based on the topology of the systemic
6risk network, we can categorize ﬁrms into three broad groups according to their type and
extent of connectedness with other companies: main risk transmitters, risk recipients and
companies which both receive and transmit tail risk. From a supervisory point of view,
the second group of pure risk recipients has the least systemic impact. Monitoring their
condition, however, might still convey important accumulated information on potentially
hidden problems in those companies which act as their risk drivers. In any case, the inter-
nal risk management of these companies should account for the possible threat induced
by the large degree of dependence on others. The highest attention of supervision au-
thorities should be attracted by ﬁrms which mainly appear as risk drivers or are highly
interconnected risk transmitters in the system. These are particularly ﬁrms in the center
of the network which appear as “too interconnected to fail”, but also large risk producers
at the boundary which are linked to only a few but heavily connected risk transmitters.
While the systemic risk network yields qualitative information on risk channels and
roles of companies within the ﬁnancial system, estimates of systemic risk betas allow to
quantify the resulting individual systemic relevance and thus complement the full picture.
Ranking companies based on (realized) systemic risk betas shows that large depositories
are particularly risky. After controlling for all relevant network effects, they have the
overall strongest impact on systemic risk and should be regulated accordingly. Conﬁrm-
ing general intuition, time evolutions of (realized) systemic risk betas indicate that most
companies’ systemic risk contribution sharply increases during the 2007/08 ﬁnancial cri-
sis. These effects are particularly pronounced for ﬁrms, which indeed got into ﬁnancial
distress during the crisis and are (ex post) identiﬁed as being clearly systemically risky by
our approach. Figure 2 exemplarily illustrates the evolutions of their marginal systemic
contributions – as reﬂected by systemic risk betas – as well as their exposure to idiosyn-
cratic tail risk – as quantiﬁed by their VaR. A detailed pre-crisis case study conﬁrms the
validity of our methodology since ﬁrms such as, e.g., Lehman Brothers are ex-ante iden-
tiﬁed as being highly systemically relevant. It is well-known that their subsequent failure
has indeed had a huge impact on the stability of the entire ﬁnancial system. Likewise, the
extensive bail-outs of American International Group (AIG), Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
7can be justiﬁed given their high systemic risk betas and high interconnectedness by the
end of 2007.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the paper’s
link to related literature and presents the underlying data. In Section 3, we present the
model and estimation procedure for individual companies’ VaRs which are the basis for
determining the systemic tail-risk network structure. The realized systemic risk beta is
formally introduced in Section 4 and is identiﬁed for each ﬁrm in an individually tailored
parsimonious partial equilibrium setting. The section also contains the corresponding
estimation procedure and valid inference for a two-step quantile regression setting. Em-
pirical results are presented in form of systemic risk rankings. In Section 5, we robustify
and validate our model and results. In particular, in a case study using only pre-crisis data,
we illustrate that the realized systemic risk beta works well in predicting the distress and
systemic relevance of ﬁve large ﬁnancial institutions that were affected by the ﬁnancial
crisis. Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature and data
2.1. Relation to the recent empirical literature
Our paper relates to several strands of recent empirical literature on systemic risk con-
tributions. Building on VaR, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) were the ﬁrst to model
systemic risk contributions based on balance sheet characteristics. Their systemic impact
measure, CoV aR, builds on deviations of a ﬁrm’s CoVaR from a respective median
benchmark. While CoVaR also aims at measuring the impact of a ﬁrm’s individual risk
on the system VaR, there are, however, substantial conceptional differences to our real-
ized systemic risk beta: The latter is the direct marginal effect of the individual VaR on
the VaR of the system, while for CoVaR, the respective marginal effect is determined
from the return and only evaluated at the VaR. As returns are in (1   q)% of the time
8below its VaR(q)6, the corresponding estimated coefﬁcient of marginal systemic impor-
tance of CoVaR is generally larger and tends to systematically overrate ﬁrms with lower
average returns for identical risk levels in contrast to the systemic risk beta. Furthermore,
CoVaR can by deﬁnition only vary over time through the channel of individual VaRs
which can, however, due to multicollinearity effects, solely be modeled as functions of
macroeconomic market variables. Consequently, changes in a ﬁrm’s systemic relevance
in CoVaR ultimately only result from variations in underlying macroeconomic indicators.
Thus, particularly variations in a ﬁrm’s leverage or maturity mismatch as well as in its
interdependence with other institutions have no direct effect. Instead, we account for net-
work interconnections in the individual VaR and in its effect on the system. In addition,
we identify network spillovers as crucial elements for measuring individual risk and for
unbiased estimation of systemic relevance. This is illustrated in a robustness study in
Subsection 3.3.1. Moreover, our realized systemic risk beta also captures variations in
ﬁrms’ marginal systemic importance driven by changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics.
Our work also complements papers measuring a company’s systemic relevance in
terms of the size of potential bail-out costs, such as Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and
Richardson (2010), Brownlees and Engle (2012) and Acharya, Engle, and Richardson
(2012). Such approaches cannot detect spillover effects driven by the topology of the
risk network and might tend to under-estimate the systemic importance of very intercon-
nected companies. Moreover, while Brownlees and Engle (2012) study the situation of
an individual ﬁrm given distress of the system, we investigate the reverse relation and
measure the effect on the system given an individual ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial trouble. Taking
complementary perspectives, both approaches measure different dimensions of systemic
risk. However, as our model is based on economic state variables and loss exceedances,
it by construction automatically adjusts and prevails in distress scenarios under shocks
in externalities. This is a clear advantage compared to pure time series approaches (cp.
e.g., White, Kim, and Manganelli, 2010, and Brownlees and Engle, 2010) and empirically
results in realized systemic risk betas indicating the raise in systemic relevance of some
6The VaR(q) is deﬁned as the negative q-conditional return quantile.
9companies earlier than in competing settings. We illustrate these effects in the validity
case study in Section 5.2.
Furthermore, our work also complements and augments research of Billio, Getman-
sky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2012) who present a collection of different systemic risk measures.
These approaches mainly build on regressions in (conditional) means of returns. How-
ever, assessing and predicting systemic risk and ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk requires regression ap-
proaches in the (left) tails of asset return distributions, rather than in the center. Thus we
quantify extreme tail situations of ﬁnancial distress, which is in clear contrast to a cor-
relation type analysis as in Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2012). Moreover, their
determination of causality and resulting network links is entirely based on pairwise re-
lations. This approach produces misleading results in a high-dimensional interconnected
system as it is impossible to identify whether one ﬁrm drives another or if they are both
driven by a third company. Instead, our approach yields consistent results for a mul-
tivariate tail-risk network, while satisfying the Granger-causality argument in quantiles
through optimal backtest performance in overall ﬁt. Our results are also complementary
to network analysis focusing on volatility spillovers in vector autoregressive systems such
as in Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2013).
Finally, we complement macroeconomic approaches which have a more aggregated
view as, e.g., the literature on systemic risk indicators (e.g., Segoviano and Goodhart,
2009, Giesecke and Kim, 2011) or papers on early warning signals (e.g., Schwaab, Koop-
man, and Lucas, 2011, and Koopman, Lucas, and Schwaab, 2011).
2.2. Data
Our analysis focuses on publicly traded U.S. ﬁnancial institutions. The list of included
companies in Table 1 (see Appendix B) comprises depositories, broker dealers, insurance
companies and Others.7 To assess a ﬁrm’s systemic relevance, we use publicly acces-
7Companies are classiﬁed into these groups according to their two-digit SIC codes, following the cate-
gorization in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), Appendix C.
10sible market and balance sheet data. In particular, the forward-looking nature and real-
time availability of equity market data serves well to provide an immediate, actionable
and transparent measure of systemic risk. The advantage of timeliness will even pre-
vail if new ﬁnancial regulation might force institutions to reveal information on mutual
credit and liquidity linkages and leverage to supervisory authorities. At the moment, data
on connections between ﬁrms’ assets and obligations is largely proprietary and far from
comprehensive even for supervisors.
Daily equity prices are obtained from Datastream and are converted to weekly log
returns. To account for the general state of the economy, we use weekly observations
of seven lagged macroeconomic variables, Mt 1, as suggested and used by Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011) (abbreviations as used in the remainder of the paper are given in
brackets): the implied volatility index, VIX, as computed by the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (vix), a short term ”liquidity spread”, computed as the difference of the 3-
month collateral repo rate (available on Bloomberg) and the 3-month Treasury bill rate
from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (repo), the change in the 3-month Treasury
bill rate (yield3m) and the change in the slope of the yield curve, corresponding to the
spread between the 10-year and 3-month Treasury bill rate (term). Moreover, we utilize
the change in the credit spread between BAA rated bonds and the Treasury bill rate (both
at 10 year maturity) (credit), the weekly equity market return from CRSP (marketret) and
the one-year cumulative real estate sector return, computed as the value-weighted average
of real estate companies available in the CRSP data base (housing).8
Moreover, tocapturecharacteristicsofindividualinstitutionspredictingabank’spropen-
sity to become ﬁnancially distressed, C
i
t 1, we follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011)
and use (i) leverage, calculated as the value of total assets divided by total equity (in book
values) (LEV), (ii) maturity mismatch, measuring short-term reﬁnancing risk, calculated
as short term debt net of cash divided by the total liabilities (MMM), (iii) the market-to-
8We found that this set of aggregate ﬁnancial market variables provides sufﬁcient explanatory power
which cannot be augmented by additional controls such as, e.g., Fama-French type factors (see Subsection
3.3.1 for details).
11book value, deﬁned as the ratio of the market value to the book value of total equity (BM),
(iv) market capitalization, deﬁned by the logarithm of market valued total assets (SIZE)
and (v) the equity return volatility, computed from daily equity return data (VOL). The
system return is chosen as the return on the ﬁnancial sector index provided by Datastream.
It is computed as the value-weighted average of prices of 190 U.S. ﬁnancial institutions.9
As balance sheets are available only on a quarterly basis, we interpolate the quar-
terly data to a daily level using cubic splines, and then aggregate them back to calendar
weeks.10 We focus on 57 ﬁnancial institutions existing through the period from beginning
of 2000 to end of 2008, resulting into 467 weekly observations on individual returns. This
excludes companies which defaulted during the ﬁnancial crisis, but which are addressed
separately in a shorter sample case study. Thus in order to validate and robustify our ap-
proach, we re-estimate the model over a sub-period ending before the ﬁnancial crisis and
including, among others, the investment banks Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch that
were massively affected by the crisis.
3. A tail risk network
3.1. Determining drivers of ﬁrm-speciﬁc tail risk
We measure the tail risk of a company with asset return Xi
t at time t as its conditional
Value-at-Risk (VaR), V aRi
q;t, given a set of company-speciﬁc tail risk drivers W
(i)
t
Pr( X
i
t  V aR
i
q;tjW
(i)
t ) = Pr(X
i
t  Q
i
q;tjW
(i)
t ) = q (1)
9See Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), Appendix C, who explicitly show that this induces no inherent
endogeneity in the model.
10For in-sample estimation this interpolation step captures changes in balance sheet characteristics in a
smoother way than the use of plain data. For forecasting purposes, however, interpolation is not possible.
See Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2013) for details.
12with V aRi
q;t = V aRi
q;t(W
(i)
t ) =  Qi
q;t denoting the (negative) conditional q-quantile
of Xi
t.11 The relevant i-speciﬁc tail risk drivers are determined out of a large set of
potential regressors Wt containing lagged macroeconomic state variables Mt 1, lagged
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics C
i
t 1, the i-speciﬁc lagged return Xi
t 1, and inﬂuences of all
other companies apart from i, E
 i
t = (E
j
t)j6=i. We capture these intra-system inﬂuences
via contemporaneous loss exceedances, where the loss exceedance of a ﬁrm j is deﬁned
as E
j
t = X
j
t1(X
j
t  ^ Q
j
0:1) and ^ Q0:1 is the unconditional 10% sample quantile of Xj.
Hence, company j only affects the VaR of company i if the former is under pressure.
We model the conditional VaR of ﬁrm i at time point t = 1;:::;T as a linear function
of the i-speciﬁc tail risk drivers W
(i)
t ,
V aR
i
q = W
(i)0

i
q : (2)
This could be estimated from a corresponding linear model in the respective return quan-
tile
X
i
t =  W
(i)
t
0

i
q + "
i
t; with Qq("
i
tjW
(i)
t ) = 0 (3)
if we knew the i-relevant risk drivers W
(i) selected out of W. Then, estimates b 
i
q of 
i
q
could be obtained according to standard linear quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett,
1978) by minimizing
1
T
T X
t=1
q

X
i
t + W
(i)
t
0

i
q

(4)
with loss function q(u) = u(q   I(u < 0)), where the indicator I() is 1 for u < 0 and
zero otherwise, and
[ V aR
i
q;t = W
(i)
t
0b 
i
q : (5)
However, the relevant risk drivers W
(i) for ﬁrm i are unknown and must be determined
from W in advance. This model selection should not be imposed but should be data-
11Deﬁning VaR as the negative p-quantile ensures that the Value-at-Risk is positive and is interpreted as
a loss position.
13driven. Appropriate econometric techniques are not straightforward in the given setting
as tests on the individual signiﬁcance of single variables do not account for the (possibly
high) collinearity between the covariates. Moreover, sequences of joint signiﬁcance tests
have too many possible variations to be easily checked in case of more than 60 variables.
We choose the relevant covariates in a data-driven way by employing a statistical shrink-
age technique known as the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO).
LASSO methods are standard for high-dimensional conditional mean regression prob-
lems (see Tibshirani, 1996), and have recently been adapted to quantile regression by
Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011). Accordingly, we run an l1-penalized quantile regres-
sion and calculate for a ﬁxed individual penalty parameter i,
e 
i
q = argmini
1
T
T X
t=1
q
 
X
i
t + W
0
t
i
+ 
i
p
q(1   q)
T
K X
k=1
^ kj
i
kj ; (6)
with the set of potentially relevant regressors Wt = (Wt;k)K
k=1, which are demeaned,
componentwise variation ^ 2
k = 1
T
PT
t=1(Wt;k)2 and the loss function q as in (4). The
key idea is to select relevant regressors according to the absolute value of their respec-
tive estimated marginal effects (scaled by the regressor’s variation) in the penalized VaR
regression (6). Regressors are eliminated if their shrunken coefﬁcients are sufﬁciently
close to zero. Here, all ﬁrms in W with absolute marginal effects je 
i
j below a thresh-
old  = 0:0001 are excluded keeping only the K(i) remaining relevant regressors W
(i).
Hence, LASSO de-selects those regressors contributing only little variation. Due to the
additional penalty term in (6), all coefﬁcients e 
i
q are generally downward biased in ﬁnite
samples. Therefore, we re-estimate the unrestricted model (4) only with the selected rele-
vant regressors W
(i) yielding the ﬁnal estimates b 
i
q. This post-LASSO step produces ﬁnite
sample estimates of coefﬁcients 
i
q which are superior to the original LASSO estimates
or plain quantile regression results without penalization suffering from overidentiﬁcation
problems (see the original paper by Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011) for the consistency
proof of the post LASSO step).
14The selection of relevant risk drivers via LASSO crucially depends on the choice of
the company-speciﬁc penalty parameter i. The larger i is chosen, the more regressors
are eliminated. Conversely, in case of i = 0, we are back in the standard quantile
regression setting (4) without any de-selection. For each institution, we determine the
appropriate penalty level i in a completely data-driven way such that it dominates a
respective measure of noise in the sample criterion function. In particular, we use the
supremum norm of a rescaled gradient of the sample criterion function evaluated at the
true parameter value as in Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011)12. In this sense, number
and elements of the set of relevant risk drivers are determined only from the data without
any restrictive pre-assumptions. For further details on the empirical procedure we refer to
Appendix A.2.
Evaluating the goodness of ﬁt of conditional VaR model speciﬁcations should take into
account how well the model captures the speciﬁc percentile of the return distribution but
also how well the model predicts size and frequency of losses. The latter issue cannot
be captured, for instance, by quantile-based modiﬁcations of the conventional R2. We
therefore consider a VaR speciﬁcation as inadequate if it either fails producing the correct
empirical level of VaR exceedances but also if the sequence of exceedances is not inde-
pendently and identically distributed over the considered time period. This ensures that
VaR violations today do not contain information about VaR violations in the future and
both occur according to the same distribution. The respective formal test uses a likelihood
ratio (LR) version of the dynamic quantile (DQ) test developed in Engle and Manganelli
(2004) and described in detail in Appendix A.3. Berkowitz, Christoffersen, and Pelletier
(2011) show that this likelihood ratio (LR) test has superior size and power properties
compared to competing conditional VaR backtesting methods which dominate plain un-
conditional level tests (as e.g. Kupiec (1995)).
WeestimateVaRspeciﬁcationswithq = 0:05forallcompaniesemployingtheLASSO
selection procedure described above.13 Exemplary V aRi (post-)LASSO regression re-
12See Appendix A.2 Step 1 for the scaling and the exact formula.
13Due to the limited number of observations, we refrain from considering more extreme probabilities.
15sults for ﬁrms in the four industrial sectors depositories, insurances, brokers and others
are provided in Table 2. It turns out that the main relevant drivers of company-speciﬁc
VaRs are loss exceedances of other ﬁrms. In their presence, macroeconomic variables and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics often do not have any statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence and
are not selected by the LASSO procedure. In Table 2, only for Torchmark (TMK) and
Regions Financial (RF) regressors other than cross-ﬁrm links are selected. In contrast,
VaR speciﬁcations of Goldman Sachs (GS), Morgan Stanley (MS), JP Morgan (JPM) and
AIG exclusively contain loss exceedances from other ﬁrms. The general importance of
cross-ﬁrm effects as main drivers of individual tail risks is conﬁrmed by joint signiﬁcance
test of the individually selected loss exceedances E
 i
t and by the superior VaR forecast
performance. Please see the robustness Subsection 3.3 for details.
With our procedure we statistically detect “relevant” directional risk connections in
the ﬁnancial sector. Certainly, there might be several types of economic causes for a link
between two companies which can, however, empirically not be further identiﬁed from
publicly disclosed market data.14 By including ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics and macroe-
conomic state variables in our model, we do prevent, however, that determined risk con-
nections result from common economic conditions or common risk factors. Hence, we
ruleoutthattaildependenciesaredriven, forinstance, byperiodsofhighvolatility, ﬂatten-
ing of yield curves or falling overall credit quality. Accordingly, risk links are attributed
to remaining factors which are most likely direct or indirect credit or liquidity exposures
or, in some cases, business model commonalities or sector speciﬁc risk factors. In this
sense, connections between close competitors, such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stan-
ley and the inﬂuence of mortgage company Freddie Mac (FRE) on AIG both conﬁrm
market evidence.
14Note that a valid empirical classiﬁcation into different types of linkages would require comprehensive
data on direct and indirect credit and liquidity exposures of ﬁrms. Such information, however, is in large
part not publicly available.
163.2. Network model and structure
Weconstituteatailrisknetworkofthesystemfromindividuallyselectedlossexceedances
reﬂecting cross-ﬁrm dependencies.15 Taking all ﬁrms as nodes in such a network, there
is an inﬂuence of ﬁrm j on ﬁrm i, if Ej is LASSO-selected in (6) as a relevant risk
externality of ﬁrm i in V aRi
q. In particular, if Ej is part of W
(i) as its k-th component,
then the corresponding coefﬁcient i
q;k in 
i
q marks the risk impact of ﬁrm j on ﬁrm i in
the network. If Ej is not selected as relevant risk driver of ﬁrm i, there is no network
arrow from ﬁrm j to ﬁrm i.
As in the previous subsection, we use VaR speciﬁcations with q = 0:05. An overview
of the identiﬁed tail risk connections between all companies is provided in Table 3 re-
porting which company’s loss exceedance affects which others’ VaR and vice versa. We
observe that the number of risk connections substantially varies over the cross-section of
companies. While some ﬁrms such as, e.g. , Morgan Stanley, Bank of America (BAC),
American Express (AXP) as well as Bank of New York Mellon (BK), are strongly inter-
connected with many other companies, there are institutions, such as Fannie Mae (FNM),
AIG (AIG) and a couple of further insurances revealing signiﬁcantly less cross-ﬁrm de-
pendencies. In order to effectively illustrate identiﬁed risk connections and directions, we
graphically depict the resulting network of companies in Figure 6. The layout and allo-
cation of the network is chosen such that the sum of cross-ﬁrm distances is minimized.
Consequently, the most connected ﬁrms are located in the center of the network while the
less involved companies are placed on its boundary.
The resulting network topology reveals different roles of companies within the ﬁnan-
cial network. We distinguish between three major categories: The ﬁrst group contains
companies with only few incoming arrows but numerous outgoing ones and thus mainly
act as risk drivers within the system. These are institutions whose potential failure might
affect many others but, conversely, which are themselves relatively unaffected by the dis-
15In the Bayesian network literature, networks which build on direct one-step inﬂuences constitute a
so-called Markov blanket assumed to contain all relevant information for predicting the node’s role in the
network (see Friedman, Geiger, and Goldszmidt, 1997).
17tress of other ﬁrms. They should be the focus of close monitoring by supervisory authori-
ties as a failure of such a company might induce substantial systemic risk through multiple
channels into the ﬁnancial network. Our results show that only few ﬁrms belong to this
category. Examples are State Street Corporation (STT), one of the top ten U.S. banks,
Leucadia National Corporation (LUK), a holding company which is, among others, en-
gaged in banking, lending and real estate, and SEI Investments Company (SEIC), a ﬁnan-
cial services ﬁrm providing products and service in asset and investment management.
Financial distress of these banks obviously has wide-spread consequences. For instance,
State Street inﬂuences the ﬁnancial services companies American Express and Northern
Trust (NTRS), the Bank of New York Mellon and Morgan Stanley. Leucadia affects Cit-
igroup (C), one of the biggest banks in the U.S., and Freddie Mac, one of the two largest
U.S. mortgage companies. Finally, SEI Investments has links to various big institutions,
such as Bank of America, American Express, Morgan Stanley and the online broker TD
Ameritrade (AMTD).
The second group contains companies which mainly are risk takers within the system.
These companies are not necessarily systemically risky but might severely suffer from
distress of others and should account for such spillovers in their internal risk manage-
ment. According to Table 3 and Figure 6 these ﬁrms are primarily insurance companies.
Examples are Cincinnati Financial Corporation (CINF), a company for property and casu-
alty insurance, Humana Incorporation (HUM) managing health insurances or Progressive
Corporation Ohio (PGR) providing automobile insurance and other property-casualty in-
surances.
The third group is the largest category within the network. It consists of companies
which serve as both risk recipients and risk transmitters amplifying tail risk spillovers by
further disseminating risk into new channels. Due to their role as risk distributors, such
companies are key systemic players and should be supervised accordingly.
We further distinguish between strongly and less connected ﬁrms. The focus of super-
vision authorities should be on a close monitoring of the ﬁrst subgroup. Examples are
18Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, AON Corporation (AON), Bank of America,
American Express, Freddie Mac as well as the insurance company MBIA (MBI), among
others. Bank of America and Citigroup are among the ﬁve largest banks in the U.S. and
reveal strong connections to various other big institutions, such as Morgan Stanley, JP
Morgan, Goldman Sachs, American Express, Regions Financial and AIG. Details on the
speciﬁc role of Citigroup and Morgan Stanley within the system are highlighted in Figure
7. Morgan Stanley, with strong links to many companies, such as Goldman Sachs, Bank
of America, the savings bank Hudson City Bancorporation (HCBK), and the insurance
company AON, are examples for deeply connected ﬁrms located in the center of the net-
work. Likewise, Freddie Mac is strongly involved and was particularly affected by the
2008 credit crunch in the mortgage sector. Accordingly, also MBIA realized severe losses
during the ﬁnancial crisis due to investments in mortgage backed securities.
The second subgroup might be technically easier to monitor with companies revealing
risk connections with only very few other ﬁrms. Still, a close and detailed supervision
is not less important than for the ﬁrst subgroup. Examples are Fannie Mae and AIG.
Fannie Mae reveals signiﬁcant bilateral risk connections to its main competitor Freddie
Mac. AIG holds signiﬁcant positions in mortgage backed securities and as a consequence
is closely connected to both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Probably due to the same
reason, we also observe bilateral tail risk dependencies between AIG and MBIA. Even
though their number of relevant risk connections within the network is limited, such ﬁrms
can still have a crucial overall impact on the system. In case of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis,
the dependence between Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae as well as their interaction with
AIG had severe systemic consequences.
Figure 8 indicates that it is not sufﬁcient to focus on sector-speciﬁc subnetworks only.
Indeed interconnectedness of institutions occurs to a large proportion between industrial
sectors. In these circle layout network graphs, companies are grouped according to in-
dustries with risk outﬂows for each group being highlighted. We observe that tail risks
of depositories, insurances and others are relatively equally distributed among all other
industry groups. Depositories are most strongly connected and also reveal the strongest
19tail risk links among each other. This is in contrast to the other industries where cross-ﬁrm
connections within a group are less strong. Moreover, in contrast to other industry cate-
gories, the risk outﬂow of broker dealers is clearly more concentrated. They particularly
affect big banks such as Bank of America and Citigroup as well as ﬁnancial service com-
panies such as American Express or SEI. Only very few direct connections to insurance
companies are revealed.
3.3. Robustness
3.3.1. Network model validity
Given our data set, it is sensible to base our tail-risk networks on VaR levels of q = 5%.
More extreme probabilities are theoretically feasible but require a larger amount of ob-
servations for sufﬁcient statistical precision. We have also experimented with different
thresholds in the loss exceedances but found that for the present data, the 10% quantile
optimally balances the trade-off between requiring sufﬁcient number of nonzero observa-
tions in E
 i
t and a sufﬁcient number of extreme losses.
ThesigniﬁcanceofnetworkeffectsintheindividualVaRspeciﬁcationscanbeformally
tested via a joint signiﬁcance test of the individually selected loss exceedances E
 i
t in the
respective quantile regression (2). We have performed this analysis based on a quantile
regression version of the F-test for joint linear hypotheses developed by Koenker and
Bassett (1982). Our results show that the selected tail risk spillovers are highly signiﬁcant
in all but very few cases. See Table 3 for an overview of all cross-effects. The detailed
test results are available upon request.
The importance of including other companies’ loss exceedances as potential risk drivers
for a company i is also illustrated by a simple comparison of the (in-sample) forecast per-
formance of our LASSO-selected VaR speciﬁcations to corresponding models for V aRi
only using macroeconomic variables as in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). According
to the employed backtests, speciﬁcations allowing for cross-ﬁrm dependencies reveal a
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Figure 3: Boxplots of backtesting p-values indicating the in-sample model ﬁt (i.e., test-
ing the null hypothesis of formal statistical adequacy) of VaR speciﬁcations including
macroeconomic regressors only (left) and VaR speciﬁcations resulting from the LASSO
selection procedure (6) (right).
strong predictive ability and are signiﬁcantly superior to more simplistic models including
macroeconomic regressors only (and ignoring network linkages). Figure 3 illustrates the
distributions of the backtesting p-values implied by both models. Hence, inter-company
linkages add crucial explanatory power in VaR speciﬁcations.
Network effects also remain important when altering the set of economic state vari-
ables M by typical equity risk premium factors. In particular, we re-estimated the model
including four lagged weekly asset pricing factors, including the three Fama-French fac-
tors and the momentum factor according to Carhart (1997).16 However, in the presence
of network exceedances, these factors have been de-selected in all cases by the LASSO
method and thus have had no additional relevance for our model speciﬁcation. This indi-
cates that the tails of asset returns are driven by other sources than the equity risk premium
(associated with return’s conditional mean).
Our results show that the major information about cross-company dependencies in
tail risks is primarily contained in contemporaneous loss exceedances E
 i
t . In contrast,
alternative VaR speciﬁcations utilizing contemporaneous returns X
 j
t or lagged loss ex-
ceedances E
 i
t 1 imply signiﬁcantly inferior backtest performances with the regressors be-
16The data are downloaded from the website of Kenneth French on
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
21ing mostly not signiﬁcant in joint F-tests.17 Moreover, linking VaR forecasts and thus
predictions of hypothetical losses to already realized loss exceedances allows measur-
ing mutual dependencies between companies without requiring a simultaneous system
of equations in conditional quantiles. In particular, observed bi-directional relationships
between conditional quantiles and realized loss exceedances of different ﬁrms (e.g., be-
tween Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) do not reﬂect simultaneities as feedbacks are
not contemporaneous: For instance, a highly negative (realized) return of company j in-
creases the conditional loss quantile and therefore increases the VaR of ﬁrm i. However,
a higher conditional VaR of i does not necessarily directly increase the absolute realized
loss return of i but just makes it more likely. Avoiding an explicit treatment of simultane-
ities in quantiles while still addressing network dependencies is an important advantage
of our approach.18
3.3.2. Accuracy of the LASSO selection step
The ﬁrm-speciﬁc LASSO penalty parameter i is a crucial parameter in our approach as it
determines the denseness of the risk network, and also inﬂuences the outcomes from the
second stage systemic risk measure in Section 4. It is chosen in a completely data-driven
procedure, such that a backtest criterion is optimized (see Sections 3.1 and A.2). To vali-
date this model selection step and to assess whether the procedure prevents overﬁtting, we
analyze the consequences of increasing the LASSO penalty parameter. Note that higher
valuesofi leadtoselectionsofsmallermodels. Ifourprocedurehadatendencytooverﬁt
the tails, the overall goodness of ﬁt would increase for higher values of i. This possi-
bility is checked by increasing all penalty parameters by 10% and 20%, and analyzing
two different measures of ﬁt for the resulting models.19 Firstly, according to our backtest
17The corresponding results are available upon request and omitted here for sake of brevity.
18Econometrically it is an open question how to handle such a system in conditional quantiles in general.
In contrast to relations in (conditional) means, it is unclear how marginal q-quantiles constitute the respec-
tive quantile in the joint distribution under appropriate independence assumptions. Only in lags, restricted
to very small dimensions and under strong assumptions, solutions have been obtained via CaViAR type
structures (see White, Kim, and Manganelli (2010)).
19It turns out that increasing the penalties beyond 20% is not advisable as for a number of VaRs, no
regressors are selected anymore.
22criterion, the overall goodness of ﬁt deteriorates substantially, which is demonstrated by
three boxplots and exemplary illustrations of individual p-values shown in Figure 12. It
turns out that for higher values of i, the p-values decrease and thus the statistical support
for the null hypothesis of a good model ﬁt declines. Likewise, joint signiﬁcance tests do
not support the exclusion of additional regressors due to higher penalties. In particular, it
turns out that the additionally de-selected regressors are mostly signiﬁcant (jointly with
the selected ones). This ﬁnding is further robustiﬁed by a second goodness of ﬁt measure
corresponding to a Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for quantile models proposed
by Lee, Noh, and Park (2013). As shown by Figure 12, the BIC is increasing and thus
indicates a less favorable model if the penalty parameter is increased. These evaluations
support our choice of penalization and indicate that there is no evidence for a tendency of
overﬁtting the tails.
3.3.3. Network characteristics
Besides graphical illustration and inﬂow-outﬂow categorizations, standard network char-
acteristics can provide a more comprehensive picture of the interconnectedness and the
role of each network node in the system. In Figure 4, we depict ﬁrms’ pagerank co-
efﬁcient (see Brin and Page (1998)) which does not plainly count links but empirically
weights their importance in an iterative scheme.20 Conﬁrming the visual impression based
on Figure 6, the most connected ﬁrms are Lincoln National Corporation, AON, Bank of
America, TD Ameritrade and Morgan Stanley. The graph conﬁrms our ﬁnding above that
depositories tend to be slightly stronger involved than other industry groups. Particularly
insurances reﬂect a separation into a group of highly connected ﬁrms, such as Lincoln
National Corp., AON and MBI, and a group of companies being less connected, such as
AIG, Humana Incorp. , Unum Group (UNM) and Cincinnati Financial Corp.
20The key idea is to assign a weight to each node (i.e., a company in our context) which is increasing
with the number of connections to others and the relative importance thereof. The more connected a ﬁrm
is, the higher its importance and thus the higher the importance of its neighbor. The computation of the
pagerank coefﬁcient can be understood as an eigenvalue problem which can be solved iteratively. For more
details, see Berkhin (2005).
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Figure 4: The left ﬁgure displays pagerank coefﬁcients based on the estimated tail risk network
computed as in Berkhin (2005) with ordering of institutions according to sectors. On the right,
pagerank coefﬁcients are plotted versus realized systemic risk contributions measured as average
realized systemic risk betas (8) for all companies which are classiﬁed as systemically relevant
for the years 2000-2008 according to Subsection 4.3. The regression line shows only a small
correlation between the pagerank coefﬁcent and the realized systemic risk beta, supported by the
respective R2 of 0.0265 of the regression. Colors and acronyms are as in Figure 1.
Note that pagerank coefﬁcients such as other network metrics can only assess the local
impact and centrality of ﬁrms in the network containing relevant but not all information
for judging overall systemic relevance. Therefore, a risk network does not allow to fully
quantitatively assess the systemic relevance of a ﬁnancial institution. Nevertheless, the
degree of ﬁrms’ interconnectedness and the speciﬁc topology of the network or corre-
sponding sub-networks allows identifying possible risk channels in the system. These
interlinkages are central but not comprehensive for macroprudential regulation reﬂecting
the particular role of a ﬁrm as risk recipient, transmitter or distributor of tail risk. To ex-
plicitly quantify a ﬁrm’s marginal systemic relevance, we propose the concept of systemic
risk betas presented in the following section.
4. Quantifying systemic risk contributions
4.1. Measuring and estimating systemic risk betas
Besides valuable information on ﬁnancial network structures, the focus of supervision
authorities is on an accurate but parsimonious measure of an institution’s systemic impact.
We quantify the latter as the effect of a marginal change in the tail risk of ﬁrm i on the
24tail risk of the system given the underlying network structure of the ﬁnancial system. As
for ﬁrm’s tail risk in equation (1), system tail risk is measured as the respective Value-at-
Risk V aRs
p;t of the system return Xs
t conditional on V aRi
q;t and other controls. Then, we
deﬁne the systemic risk beta as the marginal effect of ﬁrm i’s tail risk on the system tail
risk given by
@V aRs
p;t(V
(i)
t ;V aRi
q;t)
@V aRi
q;t
= 
sji
p;q; (7)
where V
(i)
t are ﬁrm-speciﬁc control variables.21 It can be interpreted in analogy to an in-
verse asset pricing relationship in quantiles, where bank i’s q-th return quantile drives the
p-th quantile of the system given network-speciﬁc effects and ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroe-
conomic state variables. We classify the systemic relevance of institutions according to
their statistical signiﬁcance of 
sji
p;q at a given level and the size of their total effect
 
sji
p;q := 
sji
p;qV aR
i
t ; (8)
which we denote as realized systemic risk contribution since it is computed based on
market realizations. In contrast to the marginal systemic risk beta, the realized version
captures the full partial effect of a tail risk increase of bank i on V aRs
t and is thus cross-
sectionally comparable across banks.
Focusing on an unbiased estimate of a ﬁrm’s marginal effect, we employ for each
company a tailored i-speciﬁc model for V aRs in (7) which allows correctly evaluating
the desired effect 
sji
p;q. In particular, in each of this partial system VaR models, it is nec-
essary but sufﬁcient to control for ﬁrms which are relevant i-speciﬁc risk drivers in the
network in V aRs. Conversely, variables unrelated to V aRi do not affect ﬁrm i’s systemic
risk contribution and can be omitted in a respective parsimonious model.22 In this way, we
circumvent involved theoretical speciﬁcation issues and econometric feasibility and preci-
21Note that we only study the immediate effect of an exogenous risk shock in company i for the system.
We do not infer about further steps which should then also account for converse effects of increases of
system risk causing ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk to raise. This would require a further involved dynamic modeling
step which is beyond the scope of this analysis.
22See Angrist, Chernozhukov, and Fernández-Val (2006) for a simple Frisch-Waugh-type argument in
quantile regressions.
25sion problems of alternative comprehensive structural general equilibrium models. Even
if correctly speciﬁed, such complete models would suffer from the high dimensionality
and interconnectedness of the ﬁnancial system in the presence of limited data availability.
See Section 5 for an empirical comparison.
Consequently, we estimate the ﬁrm-i-speciﬁc systemic risk beta 
sji
q;p based on a linear
model for the system VaR of the form
V aR
s
p;t = V
(i)
t
0


s
p + 
sji
p;qV aR
i
q;t; (9)
where the vector of regressors V
(i)
t = (1;Mt 1;VaR
( i)
q;t ) includes a constant effect,
lagged macroeconomic state variables and the VaRs of all companies which are identi-
ﬁed as risk drivers for ﬁrm i via LASSO in Section 3.
Systemic risk betas in (9) are moreover allowed to be explicitly time-varying, account-
ing for periods of turbulence where not only banks’ risk exposures change but also their
marginal importance for the system might vary. In particular, we model potential time-
variation of sji through a linear model in observable factors Z
i which characterize a
bank’s propensity to get in ﬁnancial distress. As a function of lagged characteristics, such
conditional systemic risk betas and thus corresponding systemic risk rankings are pre-
dictable which is important for forward-looking monitoring and supervision of the ﬁnan-
cial system. Furthermore, linearity of 
sji
p;q;t in ﬁrm-speciﬁc distress indicators Z
i
t 1 yields
stable main effects, given the quarterly reporting frequency of these factors. The quality
of generally available data limits the expected potential for improvements stemming from
other functional forms or nonparametric estimates which would in any case substantially
increase the statistical complexity and computational burden within the two-step model.
Thus we set

sji
p;q;t = 
sji
0;p;q + Z
i
t 1
0

sji
p;q; (10)
where 
sji
p;q are the parameters driving the time-varying effects.
26The ﬁrm-speciﬁc time-varying systemic risk beta 
sji
p;q;t can then be estimated from
the (second step) quantile model (9) for V aRs
p with time variation according to (10).
The respective quantile regression becomes operational when using post-LASSO pre-
estimates [ V aR
i
t and d VaR
( i)
q;t from (6) in the respective components of V
(i) for those
regressors not directly observed in the data.23 Hence,
X
s
t =  
sji
0;p;q[ V aR
i
q;t   ([ V aR
i
q;t  Z
i
t 1)
0

sji
p;q   d V
(i)
0
t

s
p + "
s
t; (11)
where Qp("s
tj[ V aR
i
q;t; b V
(i)
t ;Z
i
t 1) = 0. Then, as in the ﬁrst-step regressions in Section 3,
estimates of all components of 
sji
p;q;t are obtained via quantile regression minimizing
1
T
T X
t=1
p (X
s
t + V
0
t
s) (12)
in the unknown parameters 
s where Bt  (V aRi
t;V aRi
t  Z
i
t 1;V
(i)
t ) is the compound
vector of all regressors in V aRs
p. This yields the resulting estimate of the full time-varying
marginal effect b 
sji
p;q in (10),
b 
sji
p;q;t = b 
sji
0;p;q + Z
i
t 1
0d p;q
sji; (13)
for given values Z
i
t 1. Constant systemic risk betas can obviously be obtained as a special
case under the restriction 
sji
p;q = 0 in the estimation (12) yielding b 
sji
p;q;t = b 
sji
0;p;q = b 
sji
p;q.
The realized beta (8) is estimated as b  
sji
p;q;t := b 
sji
p;q;t[ V aR
i
t.
For valid inference, however, the fact that certain regressors are not observed but only
pre-estimated has crucial consequences. In particular, the quantile regression asymptotic
standard errors of usual software packages based on Koenker and Bassett (1978) are gen-
23Note that a direct one-step plug-in version of the proposed two-step estimation strategy is not feasible
and leads to an identiﬁcation problem. Inserting the linear individual VaR (2) into the linear sytem VaR
model (9) yields a full model for the system’s tail risk in observable characteristics. But model selection
based on such a full model for V aRs in observables is infeasible since correlation effects among the huge
number of regressors would produce unreliable results. Furthermore, individual parameters 
sji
0;p;q and 
sji
p;q
could not be identiﬁed without additional identiﬁcation condition Qq("i
tjW
(i)
t ) = 0, implicitly bringing
back the ﬁrst-step estimation and model selection step.
27erally too small not accounting for the pre-step. In contrast to mean regressions, such
two-step results are non-standard in a quantile setting and are therefore provided in detail
in Appendix A.1. Up to our knowledge, they are new to the literature.
4.2. Determining systemic relevance
We determine systemic relevance and potential time variation thereof via formal statistical
signiﬁcance tests. Though, respective quantile versions of asymptotic t- or F-tests are not
valid in ﬁnite samples and simple direct bootstrap adaptations yield incorrect results for
quantiles.24 Therefore, we propose to base a ﬁnite sample test for any linear hypothesis
H of ^ 
sji
p;q;t on the type of test statistic statistic given by
ST = min
s2

T X
t=1
p(X
s
t + B
0
t
s)   min
s2RKB
T X
t=1
p(X
s
t + B
0
t
s); (14)
with regressors Bt and corresponding KB-parameter vector 
s as in the system VaR spec-
iﬁcation (12), and 
 referring to the constrained set of parameters of ^ 
sji
p;q;t under H. This
test is an adaptation to the quantile setting of a method proposed by Chen, Ying, Zhang,
and Zhao (2008) for median regressions. Direct operationalization of the test is com-
plicated by the fact that the asymptotic distribution of 14 involves unknown terms, and
by the non-smooth objective function of the quantile regression causing inconsistency of
conventional resampling techniques. Therefore, following Chen, Ying, Zhang, and Zhao
(2008), we provide an adjusted “wild-type” bootstrap method, which is described in detail
in Appendix A.4. We generally consider effects as being signiﬁcant if p-values are below
10%.
We deﬁne a company as systemically relevant if an increase in its possible loss posi-
tion, given all economic state variables and i-speciﬁc risk inﬂows from other companies,
24Generally, asymptotic distributions often only provide a poor approximation to the true distribution of
the (scaled) difference between the estimator and the true value if sample sizes are not sufﬁciently large.
In case of quantile regressions, this effect is even more pronounced, since valid estimates for the asymp-
totic variance have poor non-parametric rates and thus require even larger sample sizes to obtain the same
precision.
28induces a signiﬁcantly higher potential systemic loss. This requires its systemic risk beta
to be signiﬁcant and nonnegative.25 The potentially time-varying degree of systemic rel-
evance is then measured according to the size of its realized beta at the respective point
in time. We can thus determine if a company is systemically relevant by testing for the
signiﬁcance of the respective systemic risk beta, which is the joint signiﬁcance of all
components of 
sji
t . Thus, we test the hypothesis
H1 : 
sji
0 = 
sji
MMM = 
sji
SIZE = 
sji
LEV = 
sji
BM = 
sji
V OL = 0:
Whether marginal effects on the system are indeed time-varying in ﬁrm-speciﬁc char-
acteristics can be tested by the joint hypothesis
H2 : 
sji
MMM = 
sji
SIZE = 
sji
LEV = 
sji
BM = 
sji
V OL = 0:
If H2 is not rejected, we re-specify the systemic risk beta as being constant (
sji
t = sji),
re-estimate the model without interaction variables and test the hypothesis H3 : sji = 0.
4.3. Empirical results and robustness of systemic risk betas and risk
rankings
We estimate potentially time-varying systemic risk betas according to (12). As in the ﬁrst-
step estimations, we choose q = 0:05, i.e., we model the loss which will not be exceeded
with 95% probability. For notational convenience, we suppress the quantile index as
we set p = q. As potential drivers of time-variation in systemic risk betas, we take
all ﬁrm-speciﬁc tail risk drivers, i.e., Z
i
t = C
i
t, since size, leverage, maturity mismatch,
book-to-market ratio and volatility might not only affect a bank’s VaR, but also directly
25Since we do not impose a priori non-negativity restrictions, systemic risk betas can become negative at
certain points in time. In a few cases we can directly attribute these effects to sudden time variations in one
of the (interpolated) company-speciﬁc characteristics Z
i
t 1 driving systemic risk betas temporarily into the
negative region. These effects might be reduced by linking sji in (10) to (local) time averages of Z
i
t 1.
This stabilizes systemic risk betas but at the cost of a potentially high loss of information. We see this as an
alternative approach which, however, is not pursued in the given context.
29determine its marginal systemic effect. As a consequence, systemic risk contributions
of two companies with the same exposure to macroeconomic risk factors and ﬁnancial
network spillovers may still differ due to their balance sheet structures.26
We ﬁnd that the majority of ﬁrms have a signiﬁcant systemic risk beta, which is clas-
siﬁed as being time-varying in approximately 50% of all cases. In contrast, for approx-
imately 25% of all ﬁrms, we do not ﬁnd systemic risk betas which are signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero. Table 4 reports the p-values of the respective underlying tests which
are performed using the wild bootstrap procedure illustrated in Appendix A.4 based on
2;000 resamples of the test statistic.27 Table 5 lists all systemically relevant companies
for the period from 2000 to 2008, ranked according to their average realized systemic risk
contributions ^  sji. The top positions of the systemically most risky companies are taken
by JP Morgan, American Express, Bank of America and Citigroup. According to our
network analysis above, these ﬁrms are also categorized into the group of risk ampliﬁers
which are strongly interconnected and should thus be closely monitored.
Obtained realized systemic risk betas, however, contain information on systemic rel-
evance beyond a company’s network interconnectedness. This is illustrated in Figure 4
revealing only slightly positive dependencies between pagerank coefﬁcients and realized
systemic risk betas. Thus, more connected ﬁrms tend to be systemically more risky, see
e.g. , Bank of America and American Express. With an R2 of 2% in the regression, the
relationship, however, is not very strong indicating that the quantiﬁcation of a ﬁrm’s inter-
connectedness is not sufﬁcient to assess its systemic relevance which directly depends on
ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic conditions. The latter is captured by realized systemic
risk contributions but not necessarily by pagerank coefﬁcients.
26Note that we keep the set of regressors M parsimonious as described in Section 2.2. According to
Subsection 3.3.1) the increase in explanatory power stemming from additional factors such as, e.g., Fama-
French/Carhart factors is low in the presence of network effects and thus can be neglected.
27Because of multi-collinearity of time variation effects in ﬁrm characteristics for systemic risk betas,
the interpretation of individual coefﬁcients  might be misleading. Therefore, we refrain from reporting
respective estimates.
30As a ﬁrst rough validity benchmark of our assessment, we compare our results with the
outcomes of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) conducted by the Fed-
eral Reserve in spring 2009, right after the end of our sample period. While we only rely
on publicly available market data, the Fed could instead draw on extensive non-public
conﬁdential balance sheet information revealing credit- and other risk interconnection
channels among the the 19 largest U.S. bank holding companies.28 The ﬁnancial insti-
tution with the biggest potential lack of capital buffer according to the SCAP, Bank of
America, ranks among our highest systemically relevant companies leading the ranking
in June 2008 (Table 6 b). In addition, we identify six out of eight banks contained in
our database which, according to the SCAP results, were threatened by ﬁnancial distress
under more adverse market conditions.29 As we could in advance detect systemic risk-
iness of the majority of companies that were later found to face capital shortages in the
stress test scenario of the SCAP, this suggests that our method could also generally help
supervisory agencies to respectively target the collection of detailed data beyond publicly
available information within the entire banking system. For a more detailed validity study
of the realized systemic risk beta, see the section below. We particularly refer to Subsec-
tion 5.2 presenting a pre-crisis case study which also provides direct comparisons to other
empirical systemic risk contribution measures. Moreover, statistical robustness checks of
an adapted realized systemic risk beta in a forecasting setting are provided in Hautsch,
Schaumburg, and Schienle (2013).
While average systemic risk betas deliver a rough aggregated picture of systemic im-
portance, the evolution of realized systemic risk betas over time provides additional com-
pany and sector date-speciﬁc information on systemic relevance which also incorporates
28For details on SCAP, see Federal Reserve System (2009). The Fed’s measure for systemic relevance
uses the proprietary information of risk interconnections within the system in order to determine requested
individual capital buffers under different market scenarios. We relate the grouped results of the two network
based measures along the following line of reasoning: As in Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2010), companies with
the highest detected systemic relevance in 2000-2008 should carry the highest share of hypothetical loss
insurance premia and should thus also be found to face the highest requested increase in individual capital
buffers in 2009.
29We detect Citigroup, FifthThird Bancorp, Morgan Stanley, PNC, Regions Financial and Wells Fargo as
systemically relevant. Due to a lack of data, we cannot include KeyCorp and GMAC in our analysis which
also have been found to be ﬁnancially distressed in a critical macroeconomic environment.
31market feedback. We focus on respective systemic risk rankings at two speciﬁcally illus-
trative time points: Table 6a gives the systemic risk ranking for the last week in March
2007, which was a relatively ”calm” time before the start of the ﬁnancial crisis. Table 6b,
on the other hand, shows the ranking at the end of June 2008, shortly before the collapse
of Lehman Brothers. Comparing the pre-crisis and crisis rankings, we observe that gener-
ally systemic risk betas and thus the magnitude of systemic risk contributions signiﬁcantly
increased during the crisis. This is particularly pronounced for American Express, Bank
of America, JP Morgan, Regions Financial and State Street. Exceptions are Citigroup and
Morgan Stanley.
During the crisis, we detect Bank of America (BAC) as systemically most relevant.
Amongallsystemicallyrelevantcompanies, itisalsothemostinterconnectedﬁrmaccord-
ing to the pagerank coefﬁcient in Figure 4 mutually inﬂuencing and inﬂuenced by other
companies in the center of the network as Morgan Stanley, American Express, Citigroup
and Wells Fargo (see Table 3 and Figure 6). Figure 9 shows that BAC’s systemic risk beta
has been relatively stable before the ﬁnancial crisis but signiﬁcantly dropped after the is-
suance of the Federal Reserve’s rescue packages. Its realized systemic risk contribution,
however, strongly increased during the crisis driven by the individual VaR channel which
is determined entirely by corresponding network exceedances.30 In this sense, the high
systemic relevance of BAC can mainly be attributed to network effects. This is in contrast
to AIG, where the systemic realized beta after its (anticipated) government-bailout from
the beginning of 2008 is governed by a strong decline in its marginal systemic risk con-
tribution (see Figure 9). Here, network effects entering through the increasing individual
VaR, play a secondary role during this crisis period. We ﬁnd that market data seem to
incorporate bail-out information into the systemic risk beta well in advance to the actual
government intervention in fall 2008.31 In particular, the measured systemic relevance of
AIG already rapidly declines from the beginning of 2008 on to the point where AIG is
30The detailed BAC results for the post-LASSO coefﬁcients in Table 2 are omitted for the sake of brevity
but are available on request.
31For details on the USD 150 billion rescue packages from the Federal Reserve, see Schich (2009).
32no longer systemically important by the end of 2008. Thus both systemic risk beta and
realized beta tend appear being forward-looking.
By construction, realized systemic risk contributions  
sji
t might vary over time through
two channels: a time-varying beta, 
sji
t and a time-varying Value-at-Risk, V aRi
t. For se-
lected companies, these effects are schematically depicted before and within the crisis in
Figure 2 in the introduction. As for BAC, in many cases shown in Table 6, we observe
increases of realized systemic risk contributions which are mainly due to rising individ-
ual VaRs, while companies’ marginal contribution to the system VaR remain widely un-
changed (see, e.g., American Express). In most of these cases, the strong increase in VaR
is mainly attributed to tail risk spillovers in the network (see also Table 2).
In several cases, increasing individual VaRs coincide with rising systemic risk betas.
The most pronounced effect can be observed for Wells Fargo which was not even identi-
ﬁed as systemically relevant in 2007 but faces a dramatic increase of both its systemic risk
beta and its idiosyncratic tail risk making it highly systemically risky in 2008. Other ex-
amples include State Street, Progressive Ohio and Marshall & Isley. Here, direct sources
for increasingsystemic relevancecan onlybe partiallyfound inthe networkstructure (see,
e.g., State Street which does not face signiﬁcant risk spillovers from other companies but
a high systemic relevance). For two central nodes in the network, Citigroup and Morgan
Stanley, however, declining systemic risk betas overcompensate increasing VaRs result-
ing in an overall declining systemic relevance. Similarly to AIG, for these ﬁrms, network
effects play a minor (direct) role.
The above results illustrate that realized systemic risk contributions conveniently con-
dense information on banks’ systemic importance. Though, the underlying driving forces
of a bank’s variation in systemic relevance can be quite different. Therefore, only si-
multaneously analyzing and monitoring (i) network effects, (ii) sensitivity to micro- and
macroeconomic conditions, and (iii) time-variations in systemic risk betas, provides the
full picture of companies’ speciﬁc role in the network and thus builds a solid basis for
supervision authorities.
335. Model validation
5.1. A simplistic benchmark
Our measure for systemic relevance requires for each ﬁrm a two-step quantile regression
with an initial LASSO selection step. Hence, instead of a global comprehensive model
for the system VaR, it builds on a collection of tailored partial models which vary for each
company to ensure a consistent estimation of individual marginal effects (i.e., systemic
risk betas). In this subsection, we illustrate the advantages of our methodology in com-
parison with a direct one-step estimation of a single global model for the system VaR. In
the competing approach, we model the system VaR as a function of all companies’ loss
exceedances and the set of macroeconomic state variables. 32 Companies are classiﬁed
as systemically relevant if they are selected as relevant risk drivers for the system VaR.
We compare the two techniques along the sets of companies determined as systemically
relevant.
In the benchmark case, the system VaR is thus modeled as
V aR
s
p;t = 
s
1 + E
(s)
t
0

s
2 + M
(s)
t 1
0

s
3; (15)
where E
(s)
t and M
(s)
t 1 are the relevant companies among all 57 possible loss exceedances
and the relevant macro-economic indicators, respectively. Positive values of the unkonwn
quantile-speciﬁc coefﬁcients (s
1;s
2
0;s
3
0)0 indicate the degree of systemic relevance of
each ﬁrm. Note that the use of the (standard) LASSO selection mechanism according to
Section 3.1 for the benchmark model would result in an unfair comparison as it would
only use oneglobal penalty for all coefﬁcients and all companies. Conversely, our two-
step procedure implicitly assigns ﬁrm-speciﬁc LASSO penalties. We therefore use an
32Note that LASSO selection in a global system VaR model based on all institutions’ pre-estimated VaRs
would lead to largely imprecise results due to the vast amounts of pre-estimated regressors and inherent
multicollinearity effects. We therefore do not include individual (pre-estimated) VaRs but loss exceedances.
34adaptive version of the automatic LASSO procedure in (15) which uses regressor-speciﬁc
weights in the penalty.33
Figure 11 summarizes how the group of systemically relevant companies identiﬁed
by the simplistic benchmark estimation34 compares to the one determined by our ﬁrm-
speciﬁc two-step approach reported in Table 5. First, there is a considerable overlap of
companies which are systemically relevant according to both methods comprising mostly
large depositories and insurance companies (group 1). In particular, 17 out of 21 loss ex-
ceedances selected by the LASSO in speciﬁcation (15) also belong to companies whose
VaRs also have a systemically relevant effect in our network approach. The four ﬁrms
which are identiﬁed as being relevant only in the benchmark case (group 2) correspond
to relatively small companies which appear being “overweighted” by the simplistic ap-
proach. The fact that they have been selected may indeed point towards a spurious effect
due to co-movements with others. For example, corresponding to our network results,
Eaton Vance’s (EV) VaR is driven by 12 loss exceedances (see Table 3), but our signif-
icance test identiﬁes it as not systemically relevant (see equation (9)). Similar ﬁndings
hold for ETFC an the two others. The third group of companies comprises those which
are not detected as relevant in the simplistic benchmark case, but which showed a sig-
niﬁcant positive systemic risk beta. Almost all of them are deeply interconnected with
other companies, see Table 3. Prominent examples are Morgan Stanley (MS) and Wells
Fargo (WFC). In summary, a one-step approach for the system VaR (15) may only serve
as a rough tool for a ﬁrst impression on systemic relevant ﬁrms in a moderately intercon-
nected system. As it is, however, not able to capture indirect network effects, it appears to
systematically falsely reject systemic relevance of ﬁrms gaining their importance mainly
33The adaptive LASSO criterion thus minimizes
1
T
PT
t=1 q
 
Xs
t + 1 + E
0
t2 + M
0
t 13

+ 
p
q(1 q)
T
P65
k=1 wk^ kjkj. The weights wk are computed
as inverses of the absolute values of coefﬁcients from an unrestricted quantile regression, ^ k is as in (6), 
is determined as in Section A.2., where c is chosen via the in-sample VaR backtest of Berkowitz, Christof-
fersen, and Pelletier (2011) (see Section A.3.). For details on the adaptive LASSO, see Wu and Liu (2009).
34In addition to the selected exceedances, also the change in the short-term interest rate (yield3m) was
chosen as a regressor. The detailed results with obtained coefﬁcients are available from the authors upon
request.
35from their position within the network. Conversely, it tends to falsely attribute systemic
relevance to ﬁrms with insigniﬁcant marginal effects when controlling for the network.
5.2. Case-study: Pre-crisis period
In the course of the ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2009, a number of large institutions defaulted,
were overtaken by others or supported by the government. As for our general empirical
study, we required data for all considered institutions to be available over the entire period
from beginning of 2000 to end of 2008, some of these companies could not be included.
Nevertheless, to validate and robustify our ﬁndings, we perform an additional analysis
by re-estimating the model for the time period of January 1, 2000, to June 30, 2007 and
including the investment banks Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch.
Because of the shorter estimation period, differences between estimated systemic risk
contributions might be less signiﬁcant as in the analysis covering the full time period.
Therefore, as a sharp ranking of companies might not be very meaningful and hard to
interpret in this context, Table 7 rather categorizes ﬁrms into groups according to quartiles
of the distribution of realized systemic risk betas. Accordingly, we distinguish between
four broad classes: The ﬁrst group of highest systemic importance comprises 9 companies
with VaRs that signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the system VaR and are among the 25% largest
average realized betas. Its most prominent members are AIG, Lehman Brothers, Morgan
Stanley, JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs. The second group with “medium” size consists
of systemically risky ﬁrms with signiﬁcant systemic impact and average realized betas in
the third quartile of the distribution. It mainly contains large depositories and investment
banks including Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup and Regions Financial, but
also the mortage company Freddie Mac. In the third group all companies with small but
signiﬁcant average systemic risk betas are included, in particular those below the median.
Finally, the ﬁrms which are not detected as systemically risky during the analyzed time
period, are collected in the last group.
36In detail, we focus on four companies which were massively affected by the crisis:
Lehman Brothers became insolvent on September 15, 2008, and was liquidated after-
wards. Merrill Lynch announced a merger with Bank of America in September 2008,
which was executed on January 1, 2009. Furthermore, excluding the crisis period itself
may reveal the systemic relevance of the mortgage ﬁrm Freddie Mac, which is closely
connected to the second largest real estate ﬁnancing company Fannie Mae. Both were
placed under conservatorship by the U.S. government during the course of the ﬁnancial
crisis. Finally, it is interesting to investigate the systemic riskiness of AIG, which faced
major distress during the crisis and whose bailout was very expensive for the tax payers.
As shown by Table 7 (with the speciﬁc companies marked in bold), all of these ﬁrms be-
long to the group of systemically relevant ﬁrms with high or mid-sized average systemic
risk betas.
Table 8 summarizes the results of our empirical analysis for the four case study can-
didates using only the pre-crisis data. Our network analysis reveals that almost all of the
companies are subject to loss spillovers from direct competitors. See, e.g., the mutual
link of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, as well as dependencies between Lehman and both
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs. Moreover, Merrill Lynch inﬂuences Citigroup, and
TD Ameritrade Holding as well as E Trade Financial have mutual links to Lehman and
Merrill Lynch within the large online broker market. Furthermore, AIG stands out as the
by far most interconnected ﬁrm in this case study: Its VaR is affected by the tail risks
of eight competing insurers and Lehman Brothers while its losses in turn drive VaRs of
Citigroup, Aﬂac, Human, Unum and three other insurance companies.
All four companies of interest have a signiﬁcant impact on the system. The time evo-
lution of their respective realized betas just prior to the crisis in Figure 10 clearly depicts
their increasing systemic riskyness. The exemplary case of Merrill Lynch shows over a
longer horizon that the network based idiosyncratic VaR even gradually decreases despite
rising systemic importance with a realized risk beta increasing by more than 100% from
mid of 2006 to mid of 2007. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that the overall high systemic
37Lehman Brothers
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Figure 5: Exemplary time evolution of systemic importance in terms of quarterly realized
systemic risk betas from 2004-2007 for the two companies AIG and Lehman Brothers
(LEH) belonging to the group of the on average most systemically risky companies. We
depict quarterly averages reﬂecting the quarterly observation frequency of balance sheet
characteristics smoothing the exceedance effects in the VaR’s.
relevance of Lehmann and AIG can be attributed to very different time evolutions of their
realized systemic risk betas well in advance to the crisis. While the systemic relevance
of Lehman brothers grows almost monotonically towards the begin of the crisis, the real-
ized beta of AIG already faces a signiﬁcant high around 2005. It is well documented that
from the 1980s on, AIG accumulated vast amounts of complex interconnected positions
in credit default swaps (CDS) and other credit securitization derivatives and amounted to
the largest holder and issuer of such products. Investigations after the fraud scandal re-
lated to the reinsurer Gen Re in 2005 already revealed the large scale systemic impact of
the ﬁrm. This also induced a rating downgrade and resulted in a reduction of some highly
leveraged positions which ultimately build up again towards the crisis. If we compare
our results to the ﬁndings in Table 4 (page 45 in the Appendix) of Brownlees and En-
gle (2012), according to their SRISK measure, they also ﬁnd systemic relevance of LEH,
FRE and ML. Though, it is notable that in their 2007 rankings, AIG does not even appear
38on the top 10 positions, then amounting slowly from mid 2008 to the top ﬁve ranks only
until January 2009. In this case, our measure incorporates important market information
substantially quicker, thus providing a better forward-looking monitoring tool. Likewise,
also the high systemic relevance of JPM before the crisis is only picked up by SRISK with
a signiﬁcant time delay.
Our ﬁndings clearly show that in June 2007 all four companies were relevant for the
stabilityoftheU.S.ﬁnancialsystem. Theyindicatethatbailoutsduringthecrisiswerejus-
tiﬁed for Freddie Mac (and the closely tied Fannie Mae) and AIG. Also a failure of Merrill
Lynch would have led to harsh systemic consequences which could be prevented by its
merger with Bank of America in 2008. Secondly, the increasing systemic importance
of Lehman Brothers could have been monitored and thus the impact of its bankruptcy
could have been anticipated to a certain extent. The direct bi-directional linkage to JP
Morgan, as well as the connections to Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, which in turn
are deeply interconnected, indicate a high risk for contagion as a result of Lehman’s fail-
ure. Furthermore, our estimates show that Lehman’s systemic risk contribution is only
slightly lower than that of AIG, while it is substantially higher than that of, e.g., Fred-
die Mac. Given these results, bailing out the latter but not the former is not necessarily
justiﬁable from a systemic risk management point of view.
6. Conclusion
The worldwide ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2009 has revealed that there is a need for a better
understanding of systemic risk. Particularly in situations of distress, it is the intercon-
nectedness of ﬁnancial companies which plays a major role but challenges quantitative
analysis and the construction of appropriate risk measures.
In this paper, we propose a measure of ﬁrms’ systemic relevance which accounts for
dependence structures within the ﬁnancial network given market externalities. Our anal-
ysis allows to statistically identify relevant channels of potential tail risk spillovers be-
39tween ﬁrms constituting the topology of the ﬁnancial network. Based on these relevant
company-speciﬁc risk drivers, we measure a ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic tail risk by explicitly ac-
counting for its interconnectedness with other institutions. Our measure for a company’s
systemic risk contribution quantiﬁes the impact on the risk of distress of the system in-
duced by an increase in the risk of the speciﬁc company in a network setting. Both mea-
sures exclusively rely on publicly observable balance sheet and market characteristics and
can thus be used for prudent supervisory decisions in a stress test scenario.
Our empirical results show the interconnectedness of the U.S. ﬁnancial system and
clearly mark channels of relevant potential risk spillovers. In particular, we can clas-
sify companies into major risk producers, transmitters or recipients within the system.
Moreover, at any speciﬁc point in time, ﬁrms can be ranked according to their estimated
contribution to systemic risk given their role and position in the network. Monitoring
companies’ systemic relevance over time, thus allows to detect those ﬁrms which are
most central for the stability of the system. In a case study, we highlight that our ap-
proach could have served as a solid basis for sensible forward-looking monitoring tool
before the start of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007.
Our approach is readily extendable in several directions. In particular, although the
ﬁnancial system is dominated by the U.S, it truly is a global business with many ﬁrms
operating internationally. Detecting inter- and intra-country risk connections and mea-
suring ﬁrms’ global systemic relevance, should be straightforward with our proposed
methodology. Moreover, whenever additional (ﬁrm-speciﬁc or market-wide) informa-
tion is available as, e.g., reported to central banks, it can be directly incorporated into
our measurement procedure. The data-driven selection step of relevant risk drivers then
determines if and how this would increase the precision of results.
40Appendix A. Econometric methodology
A.1. Asymptotic results for two-step quantile estimation
Under the adaptive choice of penalty parameter as described in the text, the LASSO selection
method is consistent with rate OP(
q
K(i)
T log(max(K;T)), and with high probability the coefﬁ-
cients selected of W, contain the the true coefﬁcients also in ﬁnite samples. These results follow
directly from Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011). Furthermore, V aRi is consistently estimated
by the post-LASSO method described in the text which re-estimates the unrestricted model with
W(i). In particular, for all q 2 I with I 2 (0;1) being compact,
^ 
i
q   i
q  OP(
r
K(i)
T
log(max(K;T))); (A1)
since in our setting it is safe to assume that the number of wrongly selected components of W is
stochastically bounded by the number K(i) of components of W contained in the true model for
V aRi (see equation (2.16) in Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011)). We write in a slight abuse of
notation YT  OP(rT), with YT being either OP(rT) or even oP(rT) for any random sequence
YT and deterministic rT ! 0. Note that in general for T ! 1, both K and K(i) might grow
only extremely slowly in T, such that they can be treated close to being constants implying the
standard oracle bound OP(
q
log(T)
T ) in (A1).
If the true model is selected, we ﬁnd for the asymptotic distribution of the individual VaR
estimates for any q 2 [0;1];35
r
1
T

^ 
i
q   i
q
0
! N

0;
q(1   q)
g2(G 1(q))
E[W(i)W(i)0
] 1

; (A2)
where g(G 1(q)) denotes the density of the corresponding error "i distribution at the qth quantile.
This result is standard (see Koenker and Bassett, 1978). For the second step estimates, we derive
the asymptotic distribution analogously to the two-step median results in Powell (1983)
r
K(i)
T

(^ 
sji
0;p;q; ^ sji
p;q; ^ 
s
p)
0
  (
sji
0;p;q;sji
p;q;
s
p)
0
(A3)
! N

0;Q 1E

p(1   p)
f2(F 1(p))
p("s
t)  
p(1   p)
g2(G 1(p))
sji
p;q
0  
p("i
t);v
p(Zt 1"i
t)


; (A4)
where in the scalar factor, f(F 1(p)) is the density of the corresponding error "s at the pth quan-
tile, the function v
p of a vector applies p to each of its components, and 
sji
p;q = (
sji
0;p;q;
sji
p;q). The
remaining main part Q in the variance is given by Q = H0E[AA0]H with A = (W(i);vec(Zt 1 
35Required assumptions of Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011) and quantile analogies to Powell (1983)
are fulﬁlled in our setting.
41W(i)0
);VaR( i)). Denote by I and 0 identity and null matrices, respectively, and by 1 a vector of
ones of appropriate dimension. Then,
H0 =
0
B
B B
B B
@
diag(i
q;2) 0 0 0
0 diag(i
q;1) 0 0
0 0 diag(vec(1dz  i
q
0)) 0
I 0 0 0
0 0 0 Id( i)d( i)
1
C
C C
C C
A
where dZ is the dimension of Z which is 3 in our application, d( i) is the dimension of VaR
( i)
t ,
and coefﬁcients i
q;2 are those components of i
q for regressors which appear both in the ﬁrst and
the second step. Correspondingly, i
q;1 are coefﬁcients of regressors which just appear in the ﬁrst
step of the individual VaR regression. Note that in the variance matrix there is a distinction in 

for parts of V which are also controls in V aRi and VaR
( i)
t , which just appear in V aRs.
A.2. Choice of the company-speciﬁc LASSO penalty parameter i
Wedeterminei inadata-drivenwayfollowingabootstraptypeprocedureassuggestedbyBelloni
and Chernozhukov (2011):
Step 1 Take T iid draws from U[0;1] independent of W1;:::;WT denoted as U1;:::;UT. Con-
ditional on observations of W, calculate the corresponding value of the random variable,
i = T max
1kK
1
T
 
 

T X
t=1
Wt;k(q   I(Ut  q))
^ k
p
q(1   q)
 
 

:
Step 2 Repeat step 1 for B=500 times generating the empirical distribution of i conditional on
W through i
1;:::;i
B. For a conﬁdence level   1=K in the selection, set
i = c  Q(i;1   jWt);
where Q(i;1 jWt) denotes the (1 )-quantile of i given Wt and c  2 is a constant.
The choice of  is a trade-off between a high conﬁdence level and a corresponding high regulariza-
tion bias from high penalty levels in (6). As in the simulation results in Belloni and Chernozhukov
(2011), we choose  = 0:1, which sufﬁces to get optimal rates of the post-penalization estimators
below. Finally, the parameter c is selected in a data-dependent way such that the in-sample pre-
dictive ability of the resulting VaR speciﬁcation is maximized. (Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011)
proceed in a similar way). The latter is evaluated in terms of its best backtesting performance
according to the procedure described in Subsection A.3 below.
A.3. Backtest for the model ﬁt for V aRi
As suggested by Berkowitz, Christoffersen, and Pelletier (2011), for each institution i, we measure
VaR exceedances as Ii
t  I(Xi
t <  V aRi
q;t). If the chosen model is correct, then,
E[Ii
tj
t] = q ; (A5)
42where 
t is the information set up to t. The VaR is estimated correctly, if independently for
each day of the covered period, the probability of exceeding the VaR equals q. Similar to Engle
and Manganelli (2004), Kuester, Mittnik, and Paolella (2006) and Taylor (2008), we include a
constant, three lagged values of It and the current VaR estimate in the information set 
t. Then,
condition (A5) can be checked by estimating a logistic regression model
Ii
t =  + A0
t + Ut;
with covariates At = (Ii
t 1;Ii
t 2;Ii
t 3; [ V aR
i
t 1)0. Denote by  Ii the sample mean of the binary
response Ii
t and deﬁne Flog() as the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution.
Then, under the joint hypothesis
H0 :  = q and 1 = 4 = 0;
the asymptotic distribution of the corresponding likelihood ratio test statistic is
LR =  2(lnLr   lnLu)
a  2
5 : (A6)
Here, lnLu =
Pn
t=1

Ii
t lnFlog( + A0
t) + (1   Ii
t)ln
 
1   Flog( + A0
t)

is the unrestricted
log likelihood function which under H0 simpliﬁes to lnLr = n Ii ln(q) + n(1    Ii)ln(1   q).
A.4. Bootstrap procedure for the joint signiﬁcance test
The asymptotic distribution of the test statistic introduced in Subsection 4.1,
ST = min
s2
0
T X
t=1
p(Xs
t   B0
ts)   min
s2RKB
T X
t=1
p(Xs
t   B0
ts); (A7)
involves the probability density function of the underlying error terms and is not feasible. Further-
more, bootstrapping ST directly would yield inconsistent results. Therefore, we re-sample from
the adjusted statistic
S
T = min
s2
0
T X
t=1
wtp(Xs
t   B0
ts)   min
s2RKB
T X
t=1
wtp(Xs
t   B0
ts)
 
 
T X
t=1
wtp(Xs
t   B0
t^ 
s
c)  
T X
t=1
wtp(Xs
t   B0
t^ 
s
)
!
; (A8)
where ^ 
s
c denotes the constrained estimate of s, and fwtg is a sequence of standard exponentially
distributed random variables, having both mean and variance equal to one. According to Chen,
Ying, Zhang, and Zhao (2008), the empirical distribution of S
T provides a good approximation of
the distribution of ST. Thus, if the test statistic ST exceeds some large quantile of the re-sampling
distribution of S
T, the null hypothesis is rejected.
The proposed testing method does not require re-sampling of observations but is entirely based
on the original sample. This provides signiﬁcant gains in accuracy in the two-step regression set-
ting as opposed to standard pairwise bootstrap techniques as a further alternative. A pre-analysis
shows that this wild bootstrap type procedure is valid in the presented form as any serial de-
43pendence in the data is sufﬁciently captured by the regressors in the reduced-form relation not
requiring block-bootstrap techniques.36
Appendix B. Tables and ﬁgures
Table 1: Included ﬁnancial institutions in alphabetical order within sectors.
Depositories (21) Others (11) Insurance Comp. (20)
BB T Corp (BBT) American Express Co (AXP) AFLAC Inc (AFL)
Bank of New York Mellon (BK) Eaton Vance Corp (EV) Allstate Corp (ALL)
Bank of America Corp (BAC) Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp (FRE) American International Group (AIG)
Citigroup Inc (C) Fed. National Mortgage Assn (FNM) AON Corp (AON)
Comerica Inc (CMA) Fifth Third Bancorp (FITB) Berkley WR Corp (WRB)
Hudson City Bancorp Inc. (HCBK) Franklin Resources Inc (BEN) CIGNA Corp (CI)
Huntington Bancshares Inc. (HBAN) Legg Mason Inc (LM) C N A Financial Corp. (CNA)
JP Morgan Chase & Co (JPM) Leucadia National Corp (LUK) Chubb Corp (CB)
M & T Bank Corp. (MTB) SEI Investments Company (SEIC) Cincinnati Financial Corp (CINF)
Marshall & Ilsley Corp (MI) TD Ameritrade Holding Corp (AMTD) Coventry Health Care Inc (CVH)
NY Community Bankcorp (NYB) Union Paciﬁc Corp (UNP) Hartford Financial (HIG)
Northern Trust Corp (NTRS) HEALTH NET INC (HNT)
Peoples United Financial Inc. (PBCT) Broker-Dealers (7) Humana Inc (HUM)
PNC Financial Services Group (PNC) E Trade Financial Corp (ETFC) Lincoln National Corp. (LNC)
Financial Corp New (RF) Goldman Sachs Group Inc (GS) Loews Corp (L)
S L M Corp. Lehman Brothers (LEH) Marsh & McLennan Inc. (MMC)
State Street Corp (STT) Merrill Lynch (ML) MBIA Inc (MBI)
Suntrust Banks Inc (STI) Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co (MS) Progressive Corp Ohio (PGR)
Synovus Financial Corp (SNV) Schwab Charles Corp New (SCHW) Torchmark Corp (TMK)
Wells Fargo & Co (WFC) T Rowe Price Group Inc. (TROW) Unum Group (UNM)
Zions Bancorp (ZION)
 included only in the case study
36Pairwise block-bootstrap yields block lengths of one according to the standard procedure of Lahiri
(2001). Results are available upon request.
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45Table 3: Tail risk cross dependencies: For each company i, we list direct risk drivers and risk recipients
within the network topology. Respective risk drivers are loss exceedances selected by the LASSO
technique (6) as “relevant” regressors for the V aRi-model (q = 0:05) (’Inﬂuencing companies’). Direct
risk recipients (’Inﬂuenced companies’) are companies for which the loss exceedance of company i
appears as relevant via LASSO in their corresponding V aRj.
Name Inﬂuencing companies Inﬂuenced companies
Broker Dealers
ETFC AMTD,GS,MS AMTD,C
GS C,JPM,LM,MS,SCHW BEN,C,ETFC,JPM,LM,MS,SCHW
MS AIG,AON,BAC,EV,GS,HBAN,HCBK,MTB,SCHW,SEIC,STT AMTD,BAC,EV,GS,HUM,LNC,ETFC,SEIC
SCHW AMTD,GS,JPM,NTRS,TROW AMTD,MS,GS,JPM
TROW AMTD,BEN,EV,JPM,LUK,NTRS,SEIC,SNV AON,MBI,MMC,AMTD,AXP,BEN,EV,NTRS,SCHW
Depositories
BAC AON,AXP,C,HBAN,LM,MS,MTB,PBCT,PNC,SEIC,STI,WFC AXP,BBT,C,CMA,HCBK,JPM,LM,MBI,MS,MTB,PNC,STI,WFC
BBT BAC,FITB,MTB,NTRS,STI,TMK,UNP,WFC AXP,BEN,CMA,FRE,MTB,RF,TMK,UNP,WFC,ZION
BK AXP,JPM,MTB,NTRS,SNV,STT,WFC CMA,JPM,NTRS,SEIC,SNV
C BAC,ETFC,FITB,GS,JPM,LNC,LUK,MBI,MTB BAC,GS,JPM,LUK
CMA AON,BAC,BBT,BK,HBAN,RF,SNV,WFC AON,PNC,SNV,ZION
HBAN AON,LNC,RF,STI,ZION AON,BAC,CMA,EV,LNC,MS,PBCT,RF,ZION
HCBK AON,BAC,MBI,MTB,NYB MS,MTB
JPM BAC,BK,C,GS,PNC,SCHW BK,C,GS,SCHW,SEIC,TROW
MI MMC,TMK HIG,MMC
MTB BAC,BBT,HCBK,NYB,SNV,ZION AON,BAC,BBT,BK,HCBK,MS,SNV,WFC,ZION,C
NTRS BEN,BK,LUK,MMC,SEIC,STT,TROW AFL,AMTD,BBT,BEN,BK,HIG,MMC,PGR,SCHW,TMK,TROW,LUK,STT
NYB PBCT,WFC MTB,SLM,WFC,HCBK,PBCT
PBCT HBAN,NYB AON,BAC,CB,NYB,RF
PNC BAC,CMA,STT,TMK,WFC,ZION BAC,JPM,ZION
RF AMTD,AON,BBT,FITB,HBAN,PBCT,STI,ZION AIG,AON,CMA,EV,FITB,HBAN,MBI,SNV,STI,ZION
SLM AON,AXP,FRE,MBI,NYB AON,AXP,BEN,EV,FITB,MBI
SNV BK,CMA,FITB,MTB,RF,ZION BEN,BK,CMA,FITB,MTB,TROW
STI AON,BAC,FITB,LNC,RF,WFC,ZION AFL,AON,BAC,BBT,FITB,HBAN,RF,ZION,CINF,HUM,UNM,WFC
STT AXP,NTRS AXP,BK,NTRS,PNC,MS
WFC BAC,BBT,CB,LNC,MTB,NYB,STI FITB,PNC,STI,AFL,BAC,BBT,BK,CMA,NYB
ZION BBT,CMA,HBAN,MTB,PNC,RF,STI AON,RF,FITB,HBAN,LNC,MTB,PNC,SNV,STI
Insurance Companies
AFL ALL,AON,CNA,EV,NTRS,SEIC,STI,TMK,WFC AXP,CB,EV,PGR,TMK,UNM
AIG FRE,MBI,RF,TMK FNM,MBI,MS
ALL CB,CNA,L,LNC,TMK AFL,PGR,TMK,UNM
AON CMA,HBAN,MBI,MTB,PBCT,RF,SLM,STI,TROW,ZION AFL,BAC,BEN,CMA,EV,FITB,HBAN,HCBK,LM,MBI,MS,RF,SLM,STI
CB AFL,L,LNC,PBCT,PGR ALL,CINF,EV,HIG,L,WFC,WRB
CI CNA,HNT,HUM,LNC HNT,HUM,LNC
CINF CB,MBI,STI AXP,LM
CNA EV,L,LNC,MBI AFL,ALL,CI,L,LNC,MBI
CVH HUM SEIC
HIG CB,L,LNC,MI,NTRS,TMK HUM,LNC,TMK
HNT CI,EV,HUM,LM,LNC,PGR CI,HUM,LM
HUM CI,HIG,HNT,MS,STI CI,HNT
L CB,CNA,LNC,TMK,UNP ALL,AXP,CB,CNA,HIG,LNC,UNM,UNP
LNC CI,CNA,EV,HBAN,HIG,L,MS,SEIC,TMK,ZION ALL,C,CB,CNA,HBAN,HIG,HNT,L,SEIC,STI,TMK,UNM,WFC,CI
MBI AIG,AON,BAC,BEN,CNA,FRE,RF,SLM,TROW AIG,AON,BEN,C,CINF,HCBK,SLM,CNA,LM
MMC MI,NTRS,PGR,SEIC,TROW,UNM MI,NTRS,UNM
PGR AFL,ALL,NTRS,WRB MMC,CB,HNT,WRB
TMK AFL,ALL,BBT,HIG,LNC,NTRS,SEIC,UNM,UNP AFL,BBT,EV,L,LNC,MI,PNC,AIG,ALL,HIG
UNM AFL,ALL,L,LNC,MMC,STI TMK,MMC
WRB BEN,CB,PGR PGR
Others
AMTD ETFC,MS,NTRS,SCHW,SEIC,TROW ETFC,RF,SCHW,TROW
AXP AFL,BAC,BBT,BEN,CINF,EV,L,SEIC,SLM,STT,TROW BAC,BEN,BK,EV,SLM,STT
BEN AON,AXP,BBT,EV,GS,LM,MBI,NTRS,SLM,SNV,TROW AXP,EV,LM,MBI,NTRS,TROW,WRB
EV AFL,AON,AXP,BEN,CB,HBAN,MS,RF,SEIC,SLM,TMK,TROW AFL,AXP,BEN,CNA,FRE,HNT,LM,LNC,MS,TROW
FITB AON,LUK,RF,SLM,SNV,STI,WFC,ZION BBT,C,FRE,RF,SNV,STI
FNM AIG,FRE FRE
FRE BBT,EV,FITB,FNM,LUK AIG,MBI,SLM,FNM
LM AON,BAC,BEN,CINF,EV,GS,HNT,MBI BAC,BEN,GS,HNT,LUK
LUK C,LM,NTRS C,FITB,FRE,NTRS,TROW
SEIC BK,CVH,JPM,LNC,MS AFL,AMTD,AXP,BAC,EV,LNC,MMC,MS,NTRS,TMK,TROW
UNP BBT,L BBT,TMK,L
46Table 4: Classiﬁcation of companies with signiﬁcant and/or time-varying systemic risk betas according
to p-values of the respective signiﬁcance tests. In all cases, the test level is taken as 10% and ﬁrms are in
alphabetical order within each category. P-values pH1 for the test on signiﬁcance of systemic risk betas in the
time period 2000-2008 are depicted in column one (see Hypothesis H1 in Section 4.3). If ^ sji is detected as
being signiﬁcant, then a second test on time-variation of ^ sji in ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics Zi
t is performed
yielding p-values pH2 (see Hypothesis H2 in Section 4.3). For ﬁrms with a signiﬁcant but not a time-varying
systemic risk beta (lower panel on the left, marked with stars), we re-estimate the systemic risk beta without
time-varying interaction terms and test again for its signiﬁcance. These results (pH3) are included in parentheses
in the second column (see Hypothesis H3 in Section 4.3).
Companies with signiﬁcant sji
Name pH1 pH2 (pH3)
AMERICAN EXPRESS 0.001 0.006
AMERICAN INTL.GP. 0.002 0.000
BANK OF AMERICA 0.002 0.001
CHARLES SCHWAB 0.019 0.013
CHUBB 0.017 0.015
CIGNA 0.001 0.013
CINCINNATI FINL. 0.010 0.004
CITIGROUP 0.026 0.066
COMERICA 0.016 0.020
FANNIE MAE 0.001 0.000
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.039 0.021
FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.028 0.030
FREDDIE MAC 0.098 0.092
HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.001 0.001
HUDSON CITY BANC. 0.043 0.035
HUNTINGTON BCSH. 0.010 0.011
LEGG MASON 0.026 0.060
LEUCADIA NATIONAL 0.041 0.016
LINCOLN NAT. 0.062 0.026
M & T BK. 0.033 0.021
MARSH & MCLENNAN 0.003 0.002
MARSHALL & ILSLEY 0.020 0.019
MORGAN STANLEY 0.041 0.095
PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 0.012 0.012
PROGRESSIVE OHIO 0.007 0.003
REGIONS FINANCIAL 0.034 0.029
STATE STREET 0.054 0.049
T ROWE PRICE GP. 0.090 0.076
TORCHMARK 0.002 0.001
UNION PACIFIC 0.040 0.035
UNUM GROUP 0.079 0.097
W R BERKLEY 0.007 0.037
WELLS FARGO & CO 0.015 0.027
ZIONS BANCORP. 0.095 0.100
AON* 0.063 0.192 (0.135)
E TRADE FINANCIAL* 0.072 0.160 (0.233)
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO.* 0.014 0.237 (0.047)
NY.CMTY.BANC.* 0.040 0.132 (0.088)
SEI INVESTMENTS* 0.014 0.115 (0.025)
TD AMERITRADE HOLDING* 0.049 0.131 (0.188)
Companies with insigniﬁcant sji
Name pH1
AFLAC 0.220
ALLSTATE 0.114
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 0.199
BB &T 0.120
CNA FINANCIAL 0.410
COVENTRY HEALTH CARE 0.257
EATON VANCE NV. 0.276
GOLDMAN SACHS GP. 0.667
HEALTH NET 0.371
HUMANA 0.189
LOEWS 0.276
MBIA 0.235
NORTHERN TRUST 0.305
PEOPLES UNITED FINANCIAL 0.105
SLM 0.391
SUNTRUST BANKS 0.213
SYNOVUS FINL. 0.289
47Table 5: Ranking of companies according to average realized systemic risk betas over the years 2000-2008 Q3.
Most systemic risk contributions are detected as time-varying in systemic risk betas - exceptions with constant
b  
sji
av are marked by . The underlying signiﬁcance tests are performed as described in Table 4. The third column
lists relevant risk drivers for the corresponding ﬁrm within the systemic tail risk network. They are determined
via the LASSO selection technique (6) as “relevant” loss exceedances to be included in the respective company’s
V aRi-regression.
Rank Name b  
sji
av  102 inﬂuencing companies
1 JP MORGAN CHASE & CO 1.41 BAC,BK,C,GS,PNC,SCHW
2 AMERICAN EXPRESS 1.22 AFL,BAC,BBT,BEN,CINF,EV,L,SEIC,SLM,STT,TROW
3 BANK OF AMERICA 1.01 AON,AXP,C,HBAN,LM,MS,MTB,PBCT,PNC,SEIC,STI,WFC
4 CITIGROUP 0.87 BAC,ETFC,FITB,GS,JPM,LNC,LUK,MBI,MTB
5 LEGG MASON 0.83 AON,BAC,BEN,CINF,EV,GS,HNT,MBI
6 REGIONS FINANCIAL 0.72 AMTD,AON,BBT,FITB,HBAN,PBCT,STI,ZION„
7 MARSHALL & ILSLEY 0.65 MMC,TMK
8 MARSH & MCLENNAN 0.63 MI,NTRS,PGR,SEIC,TROW,UNM
9 MORGAN STANLEY 0.62 AIG,AON,BAC,EV,GS,HBAN,HCBK,MTB,SCHW,SEIC,STT
10 AMERICAN INTL.GP. 0.61 FRE,MBI,RF,TMK
11 PROGRESSIVE OHIO 0.58 AFL,ALL,NTRS,WRB
12 STATE STREET 0.55 AXP,NTRS
13 ZIONS BANCORP 0.51 BBT,CMA,HBAN,MTB,PNC,RF,STI,
14 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.49 AON,LUK,RF,SLM,SNV,STI,WFC,ZION
15 NY.CMTY.BANC. 0.49 PBCT,WFC
16 PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 0.47 BAC,CMA,STT,TMK,WFC,ZION
17 FANNIE MAE 0.45 AIG,FRE
18 FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.34 AON,AXP,BBT,EV,GS,LM,MBI,NTRS,SLM,SNV,TROW
19 CHARLES SCHWAB 0.33 AMTD,GS,JPM,NTRS,TROW
20 CHUBB 0.30 AFL,L,LNC,PBCT,PGR
21 WELLS FARGO & CO 0.28 BAC,BBT,CB,LNC,MTB,NYB,STI
22 FREDDIE MAC 0.19 BBT,EV,FITB,FNM,LUK
23 HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.19 CB,L,LNC,MI,NTRS,TMK
24 CINCINNATI FINL. 0.16 CB,MBI,STI
25 TORCHMARK 0.12 AFL,ALL,BBT,HIG,LNC,NTRS,SEIC,UNM,UNP,
26 UNUM GROUP 0.04 AFL,ALL,L,LNC,MMC,STI
48Table 6: Rankings of relevant systemic risk contributions based on estimated realized systemic risk
betas b  
sji
t at two speciﬁc points in time. In addition, estimated systemic risk betas and VaRs are listed,
illustrating the different sources of variation in b  
sji
t . Most systemic risk contributions are detected as
being time-varying in systemic risk betas - exceptions with constant b  
sji
t are marked by . The underlying
signiﬁcance tests are performed as described in Table 4.
a) End of March 2007 (before the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis)
Rank Name b  
sji
2007  102 ^ 
sji
2007 [ V aR
i
2007
1 CITIGROUP 1.78 0.263 0.068
2 AMERICAN EXPRESS 1.35 0.387 0.035
3 BANK OF AMERICA 1.16 0.304 0.038
4 JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 1.05 0.265 0.040
5 MORGAN STANLEY 1.01 0.146 0.069
6 LEGG MASON 0.98 0.205 0.048
7 MARSH & MCLENNAN 0.83 0.222 0.037
8 REGIONS FINANCIAL 0.78 0.202 0.038
9 PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 0.77 0.248 0.031
10 CHUBB 0.74 0.240 0.031
11 AMERICAN INTL.GP. 0.61 0.143 0.043
12 FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.60 0.143 0.042
13 STATE STREET 0.51 0.114 0.045
14 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.50 0.104 0.048
15 PROGRESSIVE OHIO 0.42 0.092 0.046
16 NY.CMTY.BANC. 0.41 0.090 0.045
17 MARSHALL & ILSLEY 0.40 0.088 0.045
18 TORCHMARK 0.39 0.173 0.023
19 HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.38 0.099 0.039
20 ZIONS BANCORP. 0.26 0.115 0.054
21 CHARLES SCHWAB 0.25 0.042 0.060
22 FREDDIE MAC 0.23 0.057 0.041
23 LEUCADIA NATIONAL 0.19 0.057 0.033
24 CINCINNATI FINL. 0.13 0.026 0.050
25 FANNIE MAE 0.09 0.019 0.049
26 UNUM GROUP 0.23 0.045 0.051
27 T ROWE PRICE GP. 0.06 0.014 0.043
28 LINCOLN NAT. 0.04 0.010 0.036
b) End of June 2008 (during the ﬁnancial crisis)
Rank Name b  
sji
2008  102 ^ 
sji
2008 [ V aR
i
2008
1 BANK OF AMERICA 2.86 0.186 0.154
2 AMERICAN EXPRESS 2.78 0.278 0.100
3 WELLS FARGO & CO 2.51 0.186 0.135
4 MARSHALL & ILSLEY 2.31 0.516 0.045
5 JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 2.22 0.265 0.084
6 PROGRESSIVE OHIO 1.97 0.380 0.052
7 LEGG MASON 1.96 0.137 0.143
8 REGIONS FINANCIAL 1.86 0.107 0.173
9 MARSH & MCLENNAN 1.76 0.471 0.037
10 STATE STREET 1.44 0.171 0.084
11 NY.CMTY.BANC. 1.12 0.090 0.125
12 PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 1.09 0.153 0.071
13 CHUBB 1.07 0.176 0.061
14 TORCHMARK 1.00 0.177 0.057
15 CHARLES SCHWAB 0.91 0.149 0.060
16 CITIGROUP 0.90 0.072 0.124
17 MORGAN STANLEY 0.61 0.074 0.083
18 ZIONS BANCORP. 0.58 0.058 0.100
19 UNUM GROUP 0.34 0.033 0.104
20 UNION PACIFIC 0.27 0.047 0.056
21 HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.24 0.012 0.201
22 FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.17 0.026 0.064
23 T ROWE PRICE GP. 0.01 0.001 0.102
49Table 7: Group ranking of systemic risk contributions for the pre-crisis period 2000 - mid 2007. The
upper part, group 1 (’high’), contains companies with signiﬁcant average realized systemic risk betas
in the highest quartile: ^  
sji
av  100 2 [0:5;1:3]. Group 2 refers to the third quartile (’medium’) with
^  
sji
av 100 2 [0:03;0:49] and Group 3 to realized systemic risk betas lower than the median value (’small’),
for which ^  
sji
av  100 < 0:01. Group 4 includes companies not determined to be systemically risky during
the estimation period, i.e., those with insigniﬁcant systemic risk betas. Case study companies are marked
in bold.
Systemic risk contributions Companies
Group 1 ’high’ AIG, LEH, MS, JPM, GS,STT, CINF, LM, PBCT
Group 2 ’medium’ FRE, ML, BAC, C, RF, AXP, PNC,CNA, TROW, NTRS
Group 3 ’low’ FNM, WFC, EV, TMK, BBT, AFL, HUM, MI, CMA, BK,
LNC, ALL, HNT, CB, CVH, SLM, ETFC
Group 4
AMTD, AON, BEN, CI, FITB, HBAN, HCBK, HIG, L, LUK,
MBI, MMC, MTB, NYB, PGR, SCHW, SEIC, SNV, STI, UNM,
UNP, WRB, ZION
Table 8: Summary of estimation and test results for the four case study companies: loss exceedances
inﬂuencing each company’s VaR, the most important other VaRs inﬂuenced, joint signiﬁcance tests on

sji
t = 0 and estimated average systemic risk contributions as well as betas. Estimation period: January
2000 - June 2007.
Name inﬂuenced by mainly inﬂuencing overall sign. average b  
sji
t  100 average b 
sji
t
FRE AON, BBT, EV, FITB, FNM, HUM, MBI BBT, FNM 0.048 0.38 0.092
ML AMTD, CB, CNA, HCBK, L, NYB, WRB C 0.051 0.03 0.030
LEH AMTD, AON, BEN, GS, JPM, LM, LUK, MI, MS AIG, AXP, ETFC, JPM 0.041 0.79 0.176
AIG ALL, C, CB, CNA, ETFC, HIG, LEH, LNC, MBI, AFL, C, CNA, HIG, 0.026 0.73 0.210
MMC, SCHW, STT, TMK HUM, MMC, UNM
 time-varying betas
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51Figure 7: Full Network graphs of Citigroup (C) and Morgan Stanley (MS) highlighting risk drivers and
risk recipients directly connected to the respective companies with bold arrows according to the respective
size of the effect. Arrows, colors and acronyms are as in Figure 6. For simplicity, all other links just mark
spillover effects without referring to size. The list of ﬁrm acronyms is contained in Table 1.
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Figure 9: For each of the two institutions, American International Group (AIG) and Bank of America
(BAC), the respective column comprises three time series panels which depicts from top to bottom the time-
varying systemic risk beta b 
sji
t , the time-varying VaR [ V aR
i
t, and the realized systemic risk beta b 
sji
t [ V aR
i
t
of the ﬁrm.
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Figure 10: Time evolution of systemic importance for all companies in the focus of the
case study. The left column of the panel depicts quarterly averaged realized systemic risk
betas of AIG, Freddie Mac (FRE), and Lehman Brothers (LEH) during the period imme-
diately before the crisis. The right column shows quarterly averaged realized systemic
risk betas of Merrill Lynch (ML) for the longer time period from 2004 on in comparison
to its respective VaR.
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Figure 11: The schematic ﬁgure depicts companies classiﬁed as being systemically relevant according to
our two-step network technique in comparison to a simplistic one-step model with exceedances based on
LASSO for (15). Companies in the dotted area are selected by the simplistic model as systemically relevant,
ﬁrms in the gray area have a signiﬁcant systemic impact in our network model according to Table 4. Denote
the overlay region as group 1 with companies whose tail risks are determined as relevant for the system’s
risk in both settings. Group 2 are companies in the dotted but non-gray area only selected by the simplistic
model. Systemically relevant ﬁrms in the gray non-dotted region can be classiﬁed as either group 3 being
deeply interconnected with other companies with more than 6 links according to Table 3 (upper larger only
gray set in the ﬁgure) or as group 4 with few, but crucial risk links according to Table 3 (lower only gray set
in the ﬁgure with three elements).
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Figure 12: The left panel shows exemplary evolvements of p-values from the V aRi backtest described in
Section 3.3.2 when the individual-speciﬁc LASSO penalty parameters i are increased by 10% and 20%.
The respective leftmost p-value corresponds to the original choice. The right panel shows boxplots of all
p-values obtained from backtesting all the 57 VaR time series. Higher p-values indicate better model ﬁts.
At the bottom of the right panel, average values of an additional goodness-of-ﬁt measure, the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) for quantiles, are reported. Lower values imply better model ﬁts.
55References
Acharya, Viral V., Robert Engle, and Matthew Richardson, 2012, Capital Shortfall: A New Ap-
proach to Ranking and Regulating Systemic Risks, American Economic Review: Papers &
Proceedings 102, 59â˘ A¸ S64.
Acharya, Viral V., Lasse H. Pedersen, Thomas Philippon, and Matthew Richardson, 2010, Mea-
suring Systemic Risk, Working Paper.
Adrian, Tobias, and Markus K.Brunnermeier, 2011, CoVaR, Working Paper, Princeton University.
Allen, F., and D. Gale, 2000, Financial Contagion, Journal of Political Economy 108, 1 – 33.
Angrist, J., V. Chernozhukov, and I. Fernández-Val, 2006, Quantile regression under misspeciﬁ-
cation, with an application to the US wage structure, Econometrica 74, 539 – 563.
Belloni, A., and V. Chernozhukov, 2011, l1-penalized quantile regression in high-dimensional
sparse models, The Annals of Statistics 39, 82–130.
Berkhin, P., 2005, A Survey on PageRank Computing, Internet Mathematics 2, 73–120.
Berkowitz, Jeremy, Peter Christoffersen, and Denis Pelletier, 2011, Evaluating Value-at-Risk
Models with Desk-Level Data, Management Science 57, 2213–2227.
Bernanke, B., 2009, Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk, Working paper, Speech at the
Council on Foreign Relations.
Billio, Monica, Mila Getmansky, Andrew W. Lo, and Loriana Pelizzon, 2012, Econometric mea-
sures of connectedness and systemic risk in the ﬁnance and insurance sectors, Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics 104, 535–559.
Boss, M., H. Elsinger, M. Summer, and S. Thurner, 2004, Network Topology of the Interbank
Market, Quantitative Finance 4, 677–684.
Brin, S., and L. Page, 1998, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine,
Computer Networks and ISDN Systems 3, 107–117.
Brownlees, C. T., and R. F. Engle, 2012, Volatility, Correlation and Tails for Systemic Risk Mea-
surement, Working Paper, Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1611229.
Brunnermeier, M., 2009, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08, Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives 23, 77–100.
Carhart, Mark M., 1997, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, The Journal of Finance
LII, 57–82.
Chen, K., Z. Ying, H. Zhang, and L. Zhao, 2008, Analysis of least absolute deviation, Biometrika
pp. 107–122.
Cocco, J., F. Gomes, and N. Martins, 2009, Lending relationships in the interbank market, Journal
of Financial Intermediation 18, 24–48.
Degryse, H., and G. Nguyen, 2007, Interbank exposures: An empirical examination of systemic
risk in the Belgian banking system, International Journal of Central Banking 3, 951–979.
56Diebold, F.X., and K. Yilmaz, 2012, Better to Give than to Receive: Predictive Directional Mea-
surement of Volatility Spillovers, International Journal of Forecasting 28, 57–66.
Diebold, F.X., and K. Yilmaz, 2013, On the Network Topology of Variance Decompositions:
Measuring the Connectedness of Financial Firms, Journal of Econometrics forthcoming.
Elsinger, Helmut, Alfred Lehar, and Martin Summer, 2006, Risk Assessment for Banking Sys-
tems, Management Science 9, 1301–1314.
Engle, Robert F., and Simone Manganelli, 2004, CAViaR: Conditional Autoregressive Value at
Risk by Regression Quantiles, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 22, 367–381.
Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, 2009, The Supervisory Capital Assessment Pro-
gram: Overview of Results, .
Freixas, X., B. Parigi, and J. C. Rochet, 2000, Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity
Provision by the Central Bank, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 32, 611–638.
Friedman, N., D. Geiger, and M. Goldszmidt, 1997, Bayesian network classiﬁers, Machine learn-
ing 29, 131–163.
Furﬁne, Craig H., 2003, Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion, Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 35, 111–128.
Garcia, R., É. Renault, and G. Tsafack, 2007, Proper Conditioning for Coherent VaR in Portfolio
Management, Management Science 53, 483–494.
Giesecke, K., and B. Kim, 2011, Systemic risk: What defaults are telling us, Management Science,
forthcoming.
Hautsch, Nikolaus, Julia Schaumburg, and Melanie Schienle, 2013, Forecasting systemic impact
in ﬁnancial networks, International Jounral of Forecasting, forthcoming.
Huang, X., H. Zhou, and H. Zhu, 2010, Systemic Risk Contributions, Working Paper.
Iyer, Rajkamal, and José-Luis Peydrió, 2011, Interbank Contagion at Work: Evidence from a
Natural Experiment, Review of Financial Studies 24, 1337–1377.
Koenker, Roger, and Gilbert Bassett, 1978, Regression Quantiles, Econometrica 46, 33–50.
Koenker, Roger, and Gilbert Bassett, 1982, Tests of Linear Hypotheses and l1 Estimation, Econo-
metrica 50, 1577–1584.
Koopman, S. J., A. Lucas, and B. Schwaab, 2011, Modeling frailty correlated defaults using many
macroeconomic covariates, Journal of Econometrics 162, 312–325.
Kuester, Keith, Stefan Mittnik, and Marc S. Paolella, 2006, Value-at-Risk Prediction: A Compar-
ison of Alternative Strategies, Journal of Financial Econometrics 4, 53–89.
Kupiec, P., 1995, Techniques for Verifying the Accuracy of Risk Management Models, Journal of
Derivatives 3, 73–84.
Lahiri, S.N., 2001, Effects of block lengths on the validity of block resampling methods, Proba-
bility Theory and Related Fields 121.
Lee, Eun Ryung, Hohsuk Noh, and Byeong U. Park, 2013, Model Selection via Bayesian Infor-
mation Criterion for Quantile Regression Models, Working Paper.
57Leitner, Y., 2005, Financial Networks: Contagion, Commitments and Private Sector Bailouts,
Journal of Finance 60, 2925–2953.
Powell, James L., 1983, The asymptotic normality of two-stage least absolute deviations estima-
tors, Econometrica 51, 1569–1575.
Rajan, R.G., 2009, Too systemic to fail: consequences, causes and potential remedies, Working
paper, Written statement to the Senate Banking Committee Hearings.
Schich, Sebastian, 2009, Insurance Companies and the Financial Crisis, OECD Journal: Fincial
Market Trends 2009.
Schwaab, B., S. J. Koopman, and Andre Lucas, 2011, Systemic risk diagnostics: coincident indi-
cators and early warning signals, Working Paper.
Segoviano, M., and C. Goodhart, 2009, Banking Stability Measures, Working Paper 09/04, Inter-
national Monetary Fund.
Taylor, James W., 2008, Using Exponentially Weighted Quantile Regression to Estimate Value at
Risk and Expected Shortfall, Journal of Financial Econometrics 6, 382–406.
Tibshirani, R., 1996, Regression Shrinkage and Selection via the Lasso, Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, Series B 58, 267–288.
Upper, C., and A. Worms, 2004, Estimating bilateral exposures in the German interbank market:
Is there a danger of contagion?, European Economic Review 48, 827 – 849.
White, Halbert, Tae-HwanKim, andSimoneManganelli, 2010, VARforVaR:Measuringsystemic
risk by multivariate regression quantiles, mimeo, ECB.
Wu, Yichao, and Yufeng Liu, 2009, Variable Selection in Quantile Regression, Statistica Sinica
19, 801–817.
Zhou, C., 2009, Are banks too big to fail?, DNB Working Paper 232-2009, De Nederlandsche
Bank.
58 
 
No.  Author(s)  Title 
2013/19 
 
Taras Bodnar 
Nikolaus Hautsch 
Copula-Based Dynamic Conditional 
Correlation Multiplicative Error Processes 
2013/18 
 
Arthur Korteweg 
Roman Kräussl 
Patrick Verwijmeren 
Does it Pay to Invest in Art? A Selection-
corrected Returns Perspective 
2013/17 
 
Luiz Félix 
Roman Kräussl 
Philip Stork 
The 2011 European Short Sale Ban on 
Financial Stocks: A Cure or a Curse? 
2013/16 
 
Michael Aitken 
Douglas Cumming 
Feng Zhan 
High Frequency Trading and End-of-Day 
Price Dislocation 
2013/15 
 
Michael Aitken 
Douglas Cumming 
Feng Zhan 
Exchange Trading Rules, Surveillance and 
Insider Trading 
2013/14 
 
Tullio Jappelli 
Luigi Pistaferri 
Fiscal Policy and MPC Heterogeneity 
2013/13 
 
Jeffrey V. Butler 
Luigi Guiso 
Tullio Jappelli 
Manipulating Reliance on Intuition Reduces 
Risk and Ambiguity Aversion 
2013/12 
 
Tullio Jappelli 
Mario Padula 
Investment in Financial Literacy, Social 
Security and Portfolio Choice 
2013/11 
 
Christiane Baumeister 
Lutz Kilian 
Forecasting the Real Price of Oil in a 
Changing World: A Forecast Combination 
Approach 
2013/10 
 
Christiane Baumeister 
Lutz Kilian 
Do Oil Price Increases Cause Higher Food 
Prices? 
All CFS Working Papers can be downloaded at www.ifk-cfs.de/publications/working-papers. 
CFS WORKING PAPER SERIES 